As a new president assumes leadership of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA), the region’s political terrain remains fraught with tension. Although Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede has yet to disclose his plans for the war-torn region, the start of his term in office is mired in political intrigue, rigid relations with the federal government, and continued complications in the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.
In a telling sign of continuity rather than change, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) faction led by Debretsion Gebremichael (PhD) reaffirmed its unwavering stance regarding tensions with the federal government—asserting the Pretoria Agreement as the supreme legal framework governing Tigray’s near political future.
While Tigray’s elite argue the Pretoria Agreement is the only legal string binding a ‘social contract’, they justify this is because the federal government failed to restore Tigray’s constitutional privileges, including the restoration of its boundaries and reinstatement of its representatives in the federal structure.
Since the signing of the Pretoria Agreement in November 2022, the TPLF has consistently maintained that the relationship between the TIA and the federal government must be governed exclusively by the terms of that accord. Dismissing the applicability of the federal constitution or any other legal frameworks, the group’s latest statement underscores its enduring insistence on the Agreement as the sole legitimate basis for federal-regional engagement.
In an official statement released on April 11, 2025, the TPLF Central Committee reinforced its exclusive reliance on the Pretoria Agreement as the sole legal framework guiding Tigray’s political trajectory.
By framing all ongoing and future political processes, including its endorsement of the new interim President and its expressed interest for regional restructuring efforts to occur within the bounds of the Pretoria accord, the TPLF continues to dismiss the applicability of Ethiopia’s broader constitutional order in addressing Tigray’s governance and national integration.
“Based on the Pretoria Agreement, the TPLF, the people of Tigray, and the TIA have begun dialogue with the federal government regarding the reestablishment of regional governance in Tigray,” it reads.
The statement also suggests that the appointment process followed for the new president’s ascension is guided by mutual understanding under the Pretoria framework rather than federal constitutional provisions or laws that regulate the formation of regional administrations.
“Our party has endorsed Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede as the President of the TIA, and the Ethiopian government has accepted this recommendation,” it reads.
Though it calls for collaborative efforts to resolve the many pressing issues in post-war Tigray, the old guard of the prominent party repeatedly reaffirms its preference for the Pretoria Agreement over other legal or constitutional mechanisms.
”We must focus on implementing the Pretoria Peace Agreement with full dedication,” it reads.
Illustrating its more localized approach divorced from Ethiopia’s constitutional structure, the party emphasized “Tigray’s democratic framework” without reference to national institutions or the federal legal order.
“In the pursuit of rule of law, all inclusive politics are essential. The people of Tigray demand a political environment where all views are freely expressed and respected. Political differences must be resolved within Tigray’s democratic framework, and the TPLF calls on all national forces to work together toward this goal through peaceful dialogue,” reads the statement.
It frames the Pretoria Agreement as the paramount authority, bypassing the federal constitution in matters of governance, legitimacy, and legal process.
Three days after TPLF announced that it had convened a meeting to evaluate the administration’s performance over the past six months and reported that it has set plans and future directions, it disclosed details about the Chairman’s sitdown with the African Union High-Level Panel overseeing the Pretoria Peace Agreement on April 14, 2025.
In a statement issued in the aftermath of the discussions, the party indicated that a “concerning situation” has arisen regarding the implementation of the deal.
During the meeting with Major General Stephen Radina, the recently appointed head of the African Union Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Committee (MVCC) for the Pretoria Agreement implementation, Debretsion emphasized the need for the Committee to operate with impartiality and integrity, underscoring that armed forces and foreign military troops have yet to withdraw from Tigray as stipulated in the Agreement.
Stressing that the ongoing military presence undermines the spirit and legality of the Pretoria Agreement, the Chairman urged the AU panel to address these concerns promptly.
The actions of the political party that holds a fifty-plus-one vote within the TIA over the past week have once again dredged up the argument whether the constitution of the Pretoria Agreement is the governing legal framework in Tigray.
After the peace deal was signed two-and-a-half years ago, Ethiopia’s still fragile peace was further shaken by divergent interpretations of the deal that brought an end to one of the country’s most devastating conflicts.
At the center of the standoff lies the TIA, established in March 2023, whose authority—and autonomy—have become a point of contention between the federal government and the TPLF.
For the TPLF, the TIA is not merely an extension of Ethiopia’s federal architecture, but a transitional entity forged through political negotiation under extraordinary wartime circumstances.
Its mandate, the party argues, is defined not by the FDRE Constitution but by the parallel framework established in Pretoria. Disarmament, humanitarian relief, restoration of essential services, and a guided path toward peace—these are the TIA’s core tasks, not other federal terms.
This view has fueled growing friction. As federal authorities push for the normalization of governance in Tigray—calling for inclusive representation, fiscal oversight, and eventual elections—the TPLF has grown increasingly wary.
It saw these measures not as democratic imperatives but as premature federal encroachments that could unravel the fragile trust built since the war’s end.
On the other hand, the federal government maintains that its approach is both lawful and necessary. Citing the Pretoria Agreement and the FDRE Constitution, federal officials assert that the TIA functions within Ethiopia’s legal framework and remains under federal oversight. The restoration of constitutional order, re-establishment of institutions, and Tigray’s reintegration into national governance structures are all framed as essential to lasting peace, according to the federal government.
The feds also point to substantial commitments: 37 billion birr allocated for regional recovery, renewed efforts to restore services, and the finalization of a transitional justice policy to address wartime atrocities. These, it argues, are tangible steps toward rebuilding a peaceful and inclusive Tigray—within a united Ethiopia.
Yet, the political deadlock persists. While Addis Ababa envisions a reintegrated Tigray under the nation’s rule of law, Mekelle insists on a peace process insulated from federal influence until core security guarantees and justice mechanisms are in place.
For the TPLF, any deviation from Pretoria’s political blueprint is more than a misstep—it is a breach of trust.
As both sides dig in and with the latest development from the TPLF’s side, the future of Ethiopia’s peace process may well hinge on how the Pretoria Agreement is interpreted: as a framework for constitutional restoration or as a temporary departure from it.
For SalsayWeyane Tigray, an opposition political party in the region, the Pretoria peace deal stands as the supreme legal authority governing Tigray.
Berhan Astbeha, head of communications for the party, argues that the Pretoria Agreement—not Ethiopia’s federal constitution—now serves as the prevailing legal framework in Tigray.
“In practice, it is the Pretoria Agreement that governs Tigray today,” he said, arguing that the constitutional order has been sidelined in the region’s political reality.
While acknowledging that his party does not fully endorse the Agreement, Berhan emphasized its role in halting active conflict.
“We accepted the Pretoria Agreement solely as a mechanism to stop the war,” he noted. “It does not protect Tigray’s constitutional rights nor guarantee its rightful place within Ethiopia’s federal system.”
Berhan observes that Tigray is in a constitutional limbo and states that his party’s position favoring the Agreement is funneled through the gate the federal government itself opened.
He emphasized that his party’s position is rooted in the legal and political framework set in motion by the federal government itself.
“We believe the constitution has effectively ceased to function in Tigray. The national defense force, which should be safeguarding the country’s borders, was deployed internally during the war in Tigray. Moreover, the federal government waged the war in coordination with a foreign army—both actions that, in our view, violate the constitution. So, in practice, we don’t see the constitution as being operational,” he said.
However, Berhane still concedes that he can see the point of the federal government’s argument, particularly as one of the key provisions of the Pretoria Agreement is the return of Tigray to the constitutional order.
”This is the central point guiding our stance over the matter,” he said. “In navigating the other side of the coin, the TPLF, which signed the agreement, also accepted certain provisions, including respect for federal institutions and the constitution. Therefore, the TPLF has an obligation to uphold these commitments.”
Berhan was referring to article seven of the Pretoria Agreement, which states that “the TPLF shall respect the constitutional authority of the Federal Government, all constitutional bodies and organs of the Federal Government,” and commit to refraining from any acts of conscription, training, deployment, or mobilization for conflict.
He sees this clause as key evidence that, by signing the Agreement, the TPLF accepted the constitutional framework and the legitimacy of federal institutions—an obligation he argues should now guide the party’s conduct and responsibilities in the post-war political landscape.
At the same time, the federal government, which once declared the party illegal, deeming it a terrorist organization, now insists that, according to the Pretoria Agreement, the TPLF must accept the proclamations, directives and entire legal frameworks produced by federal institutions.
Berhan recognizes the TPLF is legally bound to proceed in accordance with electoral laws, perceived violations of which have led the National Election Board of Ethiopia to temporarily withdraw its recognition of the party.
Still, he argued that the federal government undermined constitutional principles by sidelining Tigray from national institutions and permitting foreign intervention. Regardless of the TPLF’s actions, he maintained, the Pretoria Agreement remains the sole governing legal framework in Tigray.
”From our party’s standpoint, the only viable and peaceful route to restoring constitutional order in Tigray is through the Pretoria Agreement,” said Berhan. “It is misleading to claim the constitution is currently functional, as Tigray lacks representation in the House of People’s Representatives, the House of Federation, and federal ministries. Laws are being enacted in the absence of Tigrayan voices.”
The party contends that only by implementing the Pretoria Agreement can the TIA reintegrate Tigray into the federal framework and secure the region’s rightful place and representation.
“We are committed to a peaceful political struggle,” said Berhan, “but peace must be anchored in justice—and in the right of Tigray to determine its future, including through a referendum. The constitution currently not effective in Tigray can not assure that. But, the Pretoria Agreement can pave the way towards asserting our constitutional rights including our right to secession.”
Yet within Tigray itself, voices diverge on what peace and justice should look like and most importantly what the Pretoria accord means for the region’s political trajectory.
For SalsayWeyane Tigray, a return to constitutional order through the Pretoria Agreement is the essential first step.
Others, however, see federal restoration as insufficient. Dejen Mezgebe (PhD), chairman of the Tigray Independence Party (TIP), a pro-secession group since its birth, argues that the Ethiopian state has lost legitimacy in the eyes of many Tigrayans.
“We don’t speak of autonomy under another rule—we speak of sovereignty,” he said. “Independence is not about isolation. It’s about preservation”
For Dejen, the repeated failures of the federal system justify a clean break, and his party has made international recognition of Tigray’s independence a diplomatic priority.
“We seek peace through peaceful struggle,” he said, countering claims that his party’s stance invites conflict. “The Pretoria Agreement is a tactical arrangement to stop the killing of our people, but it cannot and should not define the destiny of a nation.”
His party argues that the Agreement was negotiated under conditions of extreme duress, when Tigray had little choice but to accept terms dictated by overwhelming force.
“A document signed in the absence of equal power, in the absence of real sovereignty, cannot serve as a constitutional compass,” he added. “It was a humanitarian pause—not a political solution.”
From TIP’s standpoint, the true legal foundation for Tigray’s future lies not in Pretoria or in Ethiopia’s current constitution, but in the principle of self-determination—including the right to unilaterally declare independence.
“We are not bound to a framework that denies our identity,” Dejen said. “The people of Tigray—not Pretoria—will decide our future.”
Amid contrasting interpretations of the Pretoria Agreement, a central question emerges: What does the new leadership of the TIA—which assumed power less than two weeks ago—believe, and what does their background reveal about the path they may take? Much of the current debate was sparked by the very establishment of the TIA, bringing long-simmering tensions around federalism, sovereignty, and self-determination to the forefront.
As opposing forces voice sharply different visions—from those advocating constitutional restoration to those pushing for full independence—the orientation of this new TIA leadership may determine whether Pretoria becomes a foundation for lasting political resolution or merely a temporary truce before a deeper reckoning.
Its track record and the history of Lt. General Tadesse may offer some insight as to where things are headed.
Political analysts state that Lt. Gen. Tadesse’s leadership has largely emphasized military pragmatism over overt political ideology, often positioning the TIA as a stabilizing force rather than a transformative one.
According to experts, while he has publicly endorsed the Pretoria Agreement, his actions suggest a guarded approach—supporting the peace process as a strategic necessity rather than a wholehearted political commitment. His silence or ambivalence on the question of independence versus constitutional reintegration has left room for competing narratives to flourish within Tigray’s political landscape.
Experts argue that this ambiguity has allowed the TIA to maintain broad support across factions but also risks undermining clarity in this critical transition period.
