Ethiopia watched in incredulity last week as the European Union and Egypt launched the second phase of a seven-year cooperation program in what that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has described as a “deeply disappointing and problematic” move by Brussels to deepen its involvement in the long-running dispute over the use of Nile Waters.

The new Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2021–2027 elevates Cairo as the EU’s primary partner in North Africa, linking European investment and migration policy to Egypt’s stability and energy infrastructure.

The updated programme, unveiled in Cairo earlier this week, includes additional billions of Euros in funding. Although it was presented as part of a broader regional vision linking North Africa and Europe through renewable energy, green hydrogen, and climate adaptation, its geographic scope has tilted heavily toward Egypt and touches sensitive Ethiopian interests, particularly water governance and energy trade.

A joint statement issued by Cairo and Brussels on October 24, 2025, echoed Egypt’s colonial and monopolistic claims on the Nile, with the EU appearing to take a clear position on the dispute with Ethiopia for the first time.

“Recognizing Egypt’s heavy reliance on the Nile River in a context of its water scarcity, the EU reiterates its support to Egypt’s water security and the compliance with international law, including concerning the Ethiopian Dam. The EU strongly encourages transboundary cooperation among riparian countries based on the principles of prior notification, cooperation and ‘do no harm,’” it reads.

The programme comes less than two months after Ethiopia inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and, according to the Ethiopian embassy in Brussels, “shows a complete disregard for the views and interests of other riparian countries.”

The embassy noted that the River Nile, shared by eleven riparian countries, cannot be treated through a bilateral framework that ignores nearly half a billion people in Sub-Saharan Africa.

“It is regrettable that the EU decided to undermine Ethiopia in a bilateral platform with Egypt,” reads the embassy’s response, accusing Brussels of adopting a “biased and hostile position” contrary to the spirit of its long-standing partnership with Addis Ababa.

Analysts speaking with The Reporter say the deal, while framed as development cooperation, carries strategic undertones that could tilt regional influence in favor of Cairo at a sensitive moment in the Horn and Nile Basin politics.

The Ethiopian statement marked one of the country’s sharpest diplomatic responses toward the European Union in recent years. It said the EU’s position contradicted international water law, particularly the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization enshrined in the UN Watercourses Convention (1997) and the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA).

 “The EU’s distorted take on international law is deplorable,” it reads, adding that the bloc’s statement runs counter to the very frameworks it has supported elsewhere in Africa.

The statement further noted that Europe’s approach ignored its own history as an observer in the African Union–facilitated negotiations on GERD—talks in which EU representatives had witnessed all parties’ concerns and interests firsthand.

A Horn affairs expert speaking with The Reporter anonymously echoed the country’s sentiments.

“What the bloc did last week was like shooting your own foot. The EU has long anchored itself as a strong ally of regional integration. How does siding with one and accusing the other about a matter of this magnitude cement its longstanding argument? It might not look like it from an outsider’s perspective but Ethiopia has many allies, especially in this continent,” the expert said.

Ethiopia’s government has spent more than a decade promoting its image as a driver of regional connectivity. GERD was marketed not merely as a national project, but as a continental one, a source of affordable electricity for the region and a symbol of African self-reliance.

The EU’s new deal with Egypt, however, pours fresh funds into Cairo’s National Water Resources Plan 2037 and irrigation modernization efforts, without reference to transboundary cooperation in the Nile Basin. For officials in Addis, this silence cuts deep.

“It is difficult to see how the EU can claim to support regional integration while financing projects that reinforce unilateral control of shared waters,” says an Ethiopian analyst who requested anonymity. “The same Europe that preaches partnership in Addis signs deals in Cairo that exclude upstream voices.”

This week, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appeared before Parliament and delivered an address that resonated far beyond domestic politics. The PM reiterated his administration’s “Two Waters” policy, which revolves around GERD and the Nile, maritime access, and resource sovereignty.

Abiy’s words offered a window into the country’s growing frustration.

“Our demand is not new or emotional,” he told lawmakers. “It is a question of national existence, a matter of survival.”

On maritime access, the Prime Minister reiterated that “the manner in which Ethiopia lost its access to the sea was illegal and unjust,” adding that “Ethiopia can no longer remain in the status quo of being a ‘geographical prisoner.’”

He insisted, however, that any resolution would be peaceful.

”We don’t believe that war and conflict are necessary to achieve this. That is why we have been waiting patiently for five years,” said Abiy.

Experts argue that the timing of the EU–Egypt deal appears to sharpen Ethiopia’s frustration over what officials describe as “selective engagement” by external actors.

While Egypt is portrayed as a stable partner in the Mediterranean, Ethiopia’s broader development agenda, they argue, continues to be viewed through a crisis lens.

Under MIP 2021–2027, the EU commits hundreds of millions of Euros between 2021 and 2024 to projects in green transition, water management, and economic resilience.

The plan positions Egypt as Europe’s anchor state for investment and migration control — a gateway for renewable energy trade, digital connectivity, and climate cooperation across the southern Mediterranean.

Some analysts argue that the EU issued the joint statement in an attempt to sideline Ethiopia or other riparian countries from shared resources as a result of Europe’s apparent conviction that only Egypt can offer the predictability, scale, and access it desires in a turbulent region.

To Ethiopian observers, that logic is precisely the problem. By prioritizing predictability over partnership, the EU risks alienating countries that are equally vital to Africa’s integration but less convenient to manage.

The deal’s omission of Nile Basin cooperation, in particular, is glaring. Ethiopia’s USD five billion GERD remains Africa’s largest hydroelectric project, designed to serve multiple countries through power exports.

Yet, in the EU’s water-governance portfolio for North Africa, Ethiopia is nowhere to be found.

“This is not simply a funding decision,” argues an Ethiopian water policy expert. “It’s a diplomatic statement that Europe’s engagement on transboundary resources stops at Egypt’s borders.”

The EU–Egypt partnership also extends to migration control. This is another area where Ethiopia feels its leverage slipping. The joint statement on migration and security places Cairo at the center of Europe’s southern containment strategy, tasking Egypt with managing irregular flows toward the Mediterranean.

Through this arrangement, the EU channels funding for border management, surveillance, and asylum-system development, which were priorities that once formed the core of EU cooperation with the Horn of Africa under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.

For Ethiopia, the reallocation is tangible. Between 2016 and 2021, EU migration funding helped support reintegration programs, job creation for returnees, and local development projects in migration-prone areas like Amhara and Tigray. Those channels have since dried up.

“Europe is outsourcing migration control northward,” said the Horn affairs expert. “We used to be part of the conversation. Now Egypt is the conversation.”

The shift has strategic consequences. With the EU’s attention fixed on North Africa, the Horn’s voice in shaping migration policy is fading, just as irregular flows from Ethiopia and Sudan to Libya are surging, analysts contend.

Energy cooperation is another pillar where Ethiopia’s ambitions collide with the EU’s Cairo-centric vision. Under the MIP, Europe plans to invest in Egypt’s Integrated Sustainable Energy Strategy, emphasizing renewables, hydrogen, and electricity interconnection with the Mediterranean.

Projects like the MEDUSA, a major high-capacity fiber optic initiative linking Southern Europe and North Africa, set to land in Port Said by 2027, epitomize this new alignment. Europe’s future energy corridor to Africa now runs through Egypt—not the Horn.

Ethiopia, meanwhile, has staked its economic future on becoming a renewable energy exporter, leveraging hydropower from the GERD and other dams. Officials had hoped the EU members would view the Horn as a key green-energy hub.

However, experts point out that the optics instead suggest that Europe is doubling down on existing trade corridors rather than building new ones across the continent.

“The EU talks about a green partnership with Africa, but its investments follow the same old geography, the Mediterranean first, Sub-Saharan Africa later,” said one analyst who spoke to The Reporter anonymously.

The irony is sharp. Ethiopia, whose entire development narrative rests on green growth and clean energy, now finds itself overlooked in favor of projects in Cairo.

Relations between Ethiopia and the European Union have been fragile since the northern conflict in 2020. Though ties improved after the Pretoria Agreement, tensions remain over humanitarian access, governance reforms, and accountability.

Following the peace agreement, there has been a “warming up” of relations, with high-level meetings between EU officials and the Ethiopian government. A significant development was the signing of a ‘Global Gateway’ Partnership Agreement in October 2025, which aims to boost cooperation and investment in key sectors.

While the EU suspended direct budget support to the Ethiopian government during the peak of the war, it continued humanitarian aid to the population. European aid to Ethiopia, once exceeding a billion Euros annually, has not fully recovered. Addis Ababa’s access to comparable funding mechanisms has diminished, particularly as the EU redirects attention to the Sahel and the southern Mediterranean.

Since the 2022 peace deal, the EU has gradually reinstated development financing, focusing on post-conflict reconstruction, health services, education, and food security. This includes a 240 million Euro grant under the 2024 Annual Action Programme (AAP-2024) in April 2025, and a 90 million Euro financing agreement for AAP-2025 in October 2025. These funds target development in areas such as agribusiness, digitalization, and the restoration of basic services in conflict-affected regions. 

Against this backdrop, the EU–Egypt partnership feels to many Ethiopians like a diplomatic downgrading. It contrasts sharply with the EU’s earlier role as a mediator and developmental ally during Ethiopia’s reform years between 2018 and 2020.

A senior foreign relations expert puts it bluntly: “Europe once said it wanted a strong, integrated Africa. Today, it is investing in a divided one.”

For many Ethiopians, at the heart of the matter also lies a contradiction between Europe’s rhetoric and its regional conduct. The EU’s New Agenda for the Mediterranean and its Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbourhood frame the Union as a partner for African integration, inclusive growth, and shared prosperity.

Yet, the geographic concentration of funding being overwhelmingly in North Africa reinforces rather than bridges Africa’s north–south divide, according to observers.

In Ethiopia, this is seen as hypocrisy. Officials recall how European diplomats routinely call for “African solutions to African problems.” But when it comes to the Nile, Europe funds one side’s adaptation and leaves the other’s aspirations unaddressed.

“The EU’s credibility as a promoter of regional integration is at stake,” says a political expert speaking anonymously. “If integration only means connecting North Africa to Europe, then what is Africa’s role?”

For Addis Ababa, the EU’s move comes at a delicate time. Ethiopia is reasserting its regional leadership, expanding ties with the Gulf, and seeking new maritime and trade outlets through the Red Sea.

Abiy Ahmed’s recent parliamentary remarks capture the urgency of that quest.

“We did not build our maritime [capacity] to put it in a glass of water,” said the Prime Minister, as he held up a glass half-full of water in front of lawmakers.

Analysts note that the Prime Minister’s insistence on peaceful means is both a reassurance and a warning: Ethiopia will not abandon its pursuit of access to the sea, but it prefers diplomacy over confrontation.

Still, they contend that Ethiopia’s room for maneuver is narrowing. With Eritrea unyielding, Djibouti heavily commercialized, and Somalia entangled in its own crises, Ethiopia needs credible partners.

Europe, once viewed as a bridge to consensus, now appears aligned elsewhere.

The EU’s partnership with Egypt is also reshaping continental diplomacy. Foreign relations experts note that Egypt’s dual identity as both Arab and African allows it to operate in two arenas at once, a flexibility that Addis Ababa, despite hosting the African Union, cannot easily replicate.

“If Europe channels more investment and policy coordination through Egypt, the African Union itself could feel the ripple. Egypt’s influence within continental institutions may rise, while the Horn’s strategic weight could diminish,” said one analyst.

This dynamic is not lost on Ethiopian policymakers. Despite the strong language, the Ethiopian statement concluded on a constructive note, saying the country “looks forward to engaging the EU and its member states to rectify the gross and wrongful positions reflected in the ‘Joint Statement.’”

In diplomatic terms, analysts say that this suggests Ethiopia is not seeking confrontation but recalibration, a signal that dialogue remains open, provided Europe acknowledges Ethiopia’s rights and contributions.

Observers note this balanced assertiveness could mark a turning point in Ethiopia’s diplomacy with the EU, combining principled firmness with an invitation to reset the relationship.

As the EU–Egypt partnership deepens through 2027, Europe’s engagement with Africa appears increasingly defined by geography, migration, and security interests rather than shared development vision.

For Ethiopia, the challenge will be to navigate this changing landscape—protecting its interests on the Nile, maintaining strategic partnerships, and asserting its leadership within the African Union.

The Commission’s October 2025 report on freedom of movement published under the title ‘Urgent Actions Required to Ensure Full Exercise of Freedom of Movement’ documents a nationwide pattern of human rights violations — from arbitrary restrictions and road blockades to targeted violence by both state and non-state actors.

The report, released just months before the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) is expected to open voter registration, warns that continued restrictions on civilian mobility directly undermines people’s rights to freedom, protection, and property.

Political figures who spoke with The Reporter on the other hand state that failure to protect the right to free movement extends well beyond its territory and directly impacts their rights to political participation and raises questions about the credibility of the upcoming polls.

The EHRC statement, spanning multiple regions including Amhara, Oromia, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella, documents severe impediments to free movement that “threaten citizens’ constitutional rights to security, livelihoods, and participation in national life”.

The findings included in the statement highlight widespread attacks and kidnapping of civilians, unlawful road closures and checkpoint controls, and curfews.

Among the most notable incidents verified by the Commission occurred in the Amhara region’s Central Gondar Zone. On July 19, 2025, in Chilga Woreda, armed Qemant groups reportedly intercepted a convoy of vehicles traveling with a government security escort. The assailants targeted the vehicles positioned at the rear of the convoy, stopping those en route from Gondar City toward Genda Wuha. According to the EHRC report, the attackers halted several cars near Wali Daba Kebele and abducted ten individuals — five drivers and five passengers. All abducted persons were later released following mediation efforts by local elders.

In Oromia, the Commission noted repeated attacks on civilians traveling along major routes. On June 4, 2025, in Arsi Zone, a passenger bus was ambushed by armed groups believed to be linked to the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), leaving four civilians dead and one severely injured.

Through its on-site monitoring and investigation missions — particularly in the Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and Oromia regions — the Commission has observed that the imposition of frequent and prolonged curfews, the presence of multiple armed actors, and the establishment of numerous checkpoints by both government security forces and non-state armed groups have severely restricted civilians’ freedom of movement.

These restrictions, coupled with recurring road closures, ambushes, property destruction, and displacement caused by clashes and security operations, have placed the right to free movement and personal security under significant threat.

The EHRC has also documented the continued disruption of civilian movement and transport networks in several parts of the Amhara region. It stated that the road linking Mekane Selam in South Wollo Zone with Merto Le-Mariam town in East Gojjam Zone has remained closed since March 2025, following government security orders related to ongoing instability.

Similarly, the Adet–Mota–Bichena route has been shut down since early July, with restrictions still in place at the time the report was published. These closures, EHRC said, have severely constrained the daily activities and mobility of residents.

The report further noted that between August 7 and 11, the Bahir Dar–Debre Markos highway was also blocked by armed local groups commonly referred to as Fano. The Commission reports that the disruption paralyzed transport and commerce in the area, effectively cutting off movement between the two major urban centers. It described how ordinary people faced travel interruptions and shortages of essential goods as a result of the road closures.

In its findings from Benishangul-Gumuz, the Commission reported that government security forces had detained individuals traveling from the Amhara region for work in and around Assosa town.

According to the report, ethnic Amhara travelers were stopped at checkpoints, while some were  taken to local police stations, and others were reportedly ordered to return to their places of origin.

The Commission argues these actions violated freedom of movement and equal treatment provisions, though local officials defended them as temporary security measures to prevent “illegal land encroachments” and to limit infiltration by armed groups associated with Fano but contend that these mechanisms are no longer being utilized.

The report also detailed a violent confrontation in Metemma Woreda of West Gondar Zone, where government security forces clashed with an armed Qemant group at a checkpoint in Meqa Kebele on June 23. The Commission reported that the fighting began after the armed group stopped vehicles carrying fuel, goods, and passengers in an attempt to collect tolls.

The ensuing clash resulted in several deaths among drivers and passengers, and at least three people were injured.

The Commission’s call is unequivocal: the government must “ensure full accountability for human rights violations and provide justice to victims.” The statement emphasizes that despite repeated commitments to peace and reform, regional and federal security institutions have failed to prevent or respond to abuses, allowing impunity to take root.

EHRC urged authorities at all levels — from federal to woreda administrations — to verify and halt unlawful detentions, checkpoints, and collective punishments.

“Authorities must ensure that movement restrictions are strictly necessary, proportionate, and time-bound,” the Commission warned, adding that many such measures have instead become tools of control that “intensify political tensions.”

The report cited an incident that took place in the Oromia Special Zone within the Amhara region, where a supposedly temporary curfew was imposed following the murder of an individual by unknown actors. Authorities in the area have prohibited the movement of people and vehicles after 4:00 PM, and the curfew has yet to be lifted.

The EHRC confirmed that the restrictions “negatively affected pregnant women, patients, and daily laborers,” causing what it described as “an unacceptable humanitarian and social impact.”

Observers note that the EHRC’s findings arrive at a politically sensitive moment. Ethiopia is expected to hold general elections in mid-2026 — the first since the end of the northern conflict and the reorganization of the Tigray regional interim administration (TIA).

Analysts warn that the patterns of movement restriction, arbitrary arrests, and ongoing insecurity could make free campaigning and voter registration nearly impossible in several regions.

“Freedom of movement is a prerequisite for any credible election,” said a political analyst who spoke to The Reporter anonymously. “If citizens cannot travel safely to polling stations or if political candidates cannot reach communities, then the integrity of the vote is compromised from the start.”

For opposition political voices, the EHRC’s documentation of arbitrary checkpoints, curfews, and militarization of civilian zones echoes past election-year crackdowns. The Commission explicitly calls for “urgent corrective measures” to restore mobility, warning that excessive restrictions “disproportionately affect civic and political rights.”

The NEBE, meanwhile, has yet to release a detailed security assessment ahead of voter registration, and opposition political figures who spoke to The Reporter observe that  coordination with regional administrations remains one of the election’s biggest logistical hurdles.

Opposition parties across the country share a deep sense of uncertainty over whether the next elections can be held under current conditions.

Mulatu Gemechu, deputy chairman of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), told The Reporter that the atmosphere remains far from conducive for democratic participation.

“We have said this many times before — the issue of elections is still uncertain,” Mulatu said. “There is a security problem; there is no peace. That is why, for now, we have not made a decision on whether to participate in the coming election or not.”

He added that freedom of movement — a key element of any credible campaign — has effectively collapsed.

 “Right now, freedom of movement is restricted — not only for individuals to travel freely or campaign, but even the government cannot access certain areas where various armed groups are active and people are being detained,” he noted. “In such conditions, how can the voices of the people be heard properly?”

According to Mulatu, the continuation of armed conflict in multiple regions makes any notion of a national election “impractical and unjust.”

“Elections cannot take place in a situation of war. Lives are being lost, property destroyed — that is not right,” he said. “What should be done, therefore, is for both the government and the opposition to work toward peace and discuss what can bring lasting stability to this country.”

The OFC, he explained, has been unable to reopen its offices or conduct basic political training because of the restrictions.

“Our members are required to train and prepare — to educate the public about our political program, our policies, especially our political, economic, and social policies. People must know how we differ from the ruling party — what our alternative is. That requires an office, organization, and the ability to gather people in public spaces. None of that is currently possible,” said Mulatu.

In the north, similar frustrations are echoed by Salsay Woyane Tigray (SaWeT), an opposition political party that operates in Tigray Regional State.

Berhane Atsbeha, head of communications for the party, told The Reporter that mobility across and within Tigray remains perilous, raising serious doubts about the feasibility of fair elections.

 “You see, entering or leaving Tigray by car is still very difficult — there are risks in every direction,” Berhane said. “Even to move around or to campaign freely, there are many restrictions. Crimes are being committed; what we are witnessing are continuous violations of human rights. So, if these issues are not addressed in time, how can an election be held under such circumstances? That’s what this whole issue essentially points to.”

He added that within the region itself, communities remain physically isolated.

“For example, one cannot travel from the northwest to western Tigray. Within Tigray, movement from one district to another — say, from Endabaguna to May Tsebri — is impossible,” said Berhane.

He also stressed that the situation in the neighboring Afar and Amhara regions also remains unstable.

“Armed groups in the Amhara region, for instance, are still in conflict with the federal army, and that has its own implications. In this context, there is no free ground — soldiers are still stationed across Tigray, making freedom of movement, the right to work, and even the right to live safely uncertain. People’s very existence is at risk,” Berhane told The Reporter.

He noted that federal and Eritrean forces continue to control parts of Tigray, restricting civilians’ access to their land and livelihoods.

“Inside Tigray too, political activity is limited. The federal government and even the Eritrean forces, who continue to occupy parts of Tigray’s territory, make it impossible for people to move or work freely,” said Berhane.

He brought up the Irob community as an example.

“The Irob community — which lives not far from Adigrat — has not yet returned home. People can’t even enter Irob. Adigrat, one of the main zonal towns, is itself heavily restricted,” said Berhane. “So, under such conditions, when people are deprived of their natural and constitutional rights — freedom of movement, the right to work, and property ownership — how can we talk about fair elections? To claim that the country is stable or that it is ready for peaceful elections is unrealistic.”

Berhane and his party believe the Commission’s findings should be “taken seriously and strengthened,” arguing that the government’s reports of stability “do not reflect the lived reality on the ground.”

“Unless the government intends to repeat what happened in the sixth national election — when it ran alone and declared itself the winner — it is difficult to imagine how a genuine, credible election can be held. We want that to be strengthened and to create conditions where people can truly move, work, and vote freely,” said Berhane.

The EHRC report portrays a nation fragmented by mistrust and competing interests, often manifesting in violence.

In the Amhara region, Fano militias continue to exert de facto control over several areas, imposing illegal levies and disrupting transport. In Oromia Regional State, OLA insurgencies have created no-go zones where administrative control has collapsed.

These divisions have intensified ethnic profiling, with reports of passengers being targeted at checkpoints based on identity.

“The right to move freely within one’s country is foundational,” the report stresses.

Politicians have expressed their fear that continued insecurity will discourage voter turnout and deepen public cynicism about whether elections can produce change.

Beyond political implications, the report paints a disturbing picture of everyday life disrupted by insecurity. Farmers unable to transport goods, patients stranded en route to hospitals, and teachers prevented from reaching schools — all represent a silent erosion of normalcy.

The EHRC statement linked these violations to worsening economic conditions, warning that disrupted mobility exacerbates food insecurity, displacement, and unemployment, all of which may negatively impact people’s daily livelihood.

In its final recommendations, the EHRC urged federal and regional authorities to lift unlawful movement restrictions and curfews, investigate and prosecute those responsible for rights violations, guarantee unimpeded access for humanitarian actors, strengthen oversight of local security forces and reaffirm Ethiopia’s commitment to constitutional freedoms.

“Prompt and coordinated action is essential to prohibit the occurrences of rights violations and ensure justice for victims,” the Commission concluded.

Experts and political figures agree that with less than a year before Ethiopia heads to the polls, the EHRC findings underscore a nation still struggling to reconcile its democratic aspirations with the realities of insecurity and division.

If unaddressed, the restrictions documented in the report risk reducing the 2026 elections to a symbolic event, devoid of genuine competition or participation, warn political figures who spoke to The Reporter.

But if the government acts decisively and moves to restore mobility, protect civilians, and ensure accountability, it could mark a turning point toward credible governance.

“The right to move freely is inseparable from the right to vote freely,” Berhane said.

Whether Ethiopia’s leaders heed that warning may determine not just the legitimacy of the next election, but the direction of the nation’s fragile democracy itself.

‎‎Ethiopia’s mining law is a paradox: a framework designed to regulate one of the country’s most promising sectors, yet one that consistently undermines the very inclusivity and governance it claims to promote. This was the argument presented by experts and government officials who convened in Addis Ababa last month for a conference on inclusive mining governance.

Federal officials and their counterparts from the Afar and Oromia regional administrations gathered at the Hilton hotel in an attempt to remedy age-old flaws as the sector begins to grow in earnest.

Mineral exports brought in close to USD 1.9 billion last fiscal year—an all-time high driven primarily by a staggering surge in gold exports. The participants of last month’s conference argued that sustaining this level of growth requires swift and sweeping changes to the mining legislation and governance.

The Mining Operations Proclamation ratified by Parliament more than 15 years ago was the subject of heavy criticism during the lively discussion. Detractors argued the law is flawed, outdated, and ill-suited for a country that claims to respect both regional autonomy and community rights.

‎A representative from Oromia Mining Group, an influential enterprise under the Oromia regional administration that owns large stakes in several gold mining outfits, and an expert from the Ethiopian Minerals Corporation contended that the proclamation’s heavy emphasis on centralization is a root problem in the sector.

The law vests overwhelming authority in the federal government, grants Addis Ababa the power to approve or deny large-scale projects, and leaves regional administrations with limited rights over licensing, royalties, and taxation, according to the proclamation’s critics.

‎They argued that for a unitary state, this might seem natural; for a federal state, it is a contradiction that breeds tension. Participants acknowledged that regions like Afar and Oromia have long protested this legal arrangement, where regions bear the environmental scars and social upheavals of mining but see little of the revenue.

The law, by refusing to enshrine revenue-sharing, effectively tells these regions that their minerals belong to the state but their problems are their own, experts argued.

“‎The problem is not that we lack a constitution,” an official from the Oromia regional administration said during a discussion of regional experiences. “It is that the mining law ignores it.”

Article 52(2)(d) of the Constitution grants states the power to administer land and natural resources. Yet in practice, licenses and revenues are monopolized at the federal level.

“How can we talk about inclusive governance when the Constitution itself is being sidelined?” asked the official.

‎A representative of the Ethiopian Mineral Corporation pointed to contradictions and loopholes within the proclamation.  He began by referencing Article 11, which defines the criteria for acquiring a mining license: “Qualifying any person for a mining license means, first, being financially capable, and second, being technically skilled.”

‎However, he argued that these provisions are inconsistently applied.

“Since the law grants local associations licenses to mine alluvial gold, when an investor from another place brings money or knowledge, he is forced to share 30 to 40 percent of the direct sales revenue or profit. Why is this not enforced in the proclamation?” asked the rep.

‎He contrasted this with another section of the law.

“In one proclamation, it says any entity engaged in traditional mining does not need financial, technical, or professional expertise. But what if this includes all the traditionally produced gold for sale? Alluvial gold requires money, expertise, and technical capacity—otherwise; it will lead to a waste of resources and a loss of results,” he said.

‎He pointed to Adola, a gold-rich area in Oromia’s Guji Zone, as a clear example of untapped potential.

“In Adola, we need to look at the technological advances in hydraulic fracturing and dredging. In this case, 500 kilograms can be produced from one place. In this way, the country, the region, and society will benefit greatly from the quantity and quality of the product,” he said.

‎The contradictions extend to licensing conditions.

“The proclamation says mining development permits will not be granted for traditional products. However, in various regions, rock gold (Ensework) is available to traditional producers. Even if investors were to come with wealth and technology, the producers would not cooperate—or they’d say ‘Let’s work in partnership, 30/70. Investors don’t want to invest heavily for 30 percent,” he said.

‎The representative proposed a different approach.

 “It would be better if this was done by investors and the people were paid compensation. If this were the case, the country could profit much more,” he said.

‎He also questioned the standards guiding license allocation.

“How do we say the highest is the lowest when granting a mining license in the proclamation? There are situations where sediment can be produced at high levels. Do we have a standard to measure this? How detailed is this set out in the proclamation?” he asked.

‎Transparency, often touted as Ethiopia’s commitment to global standards, emerges as another hollow promise. Ethiopia has aligned itself with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, yet the law itself lacks enforceable requirements for contract disclosure or community consultation.

‎A Mineral Corporation representative raised further concerns about gaps in the enforcement of Ethiopia’s mining laws.

Referring to Article 34, he noted: “It says that licensed entities must carry out their work with care, diligence, and efficiency, and in accordance with applicable laws, technology, and accepted practices in the mining industry. But how is this measured? Isn’t it subjective?”

‎The issue of licensing authority was another point of contention.

“Chapter 52 says the regional states can issue licenses for the production of structural and industrial minerals, as well as low-level industrial minerals. The Ministry of Mining, on the other hand, says it will issue exploration, testing, and production permits to all those outside the regional authorities. But in practice, every year, the production of traditional products is given to traditional people. So why is it not being implemented in accordance with the proclamation?” asked the representative.

‎He also highlighted troubling practices in the field.

“Article 55 warns against unlawful practices that harm both workers and the public. Yet in western Ethiopia, traditional producers are widely reported to use cyanide and mercury,” he said.

‎The dialogue looked toward possible solutions, emphasizing the need for collaboration between institutions.

‎“It is believed that if the proclamation includes a clause that supports the cooperation of regional, federal, and private investors in the country, and a system is developed for this, it would be possible to establish large-scale development networks by pooling knowledge and resources among large-scale mining companies,” said the representative.

‎One potential model, he suggested, is financial-sector involvement.

“For example, if banks were to buy shares, it would be possible. I said this because money is the main problem in mining. If there is a solution to financing, then mining can grow into a real engine of development,” he said.

‎During the session on natural resource management as a governance tool, a presentation by Dereje Feyissa (PhD), the mining law contradiction was put plain. Mining contracts remain shielded from public view; environmental assessments are conducted, but the affected communities rarely see them. The law creates the appearance of openness while maintaining the reality of secrecy, a flaw that erodes trust in both government and investors.

‎On the other hand, officials and representatives of the mining companies have both agreed that no issue exposes the weaknesses of the legal regime more sharply than the role of state-owned enterprises. In theory, SOEs are bound by the same legal obligations as private operators. In practice, they function in a world of exceptions. They receive licenses and concessions without genuine competition, operate with political cover, and face little accountability.

‎The workshop’s discussion on SOEs revealed just how deeply skewed the system has become. Instead of being held to higher standards as public institutions, SOEs enjoy immunity from scrutiny. The law, by treating them as ordinary players on paper but extraordinary actors in practice, has created a two-tiered system that stifles fairness and discourages genuine competition, experts noted.

‎A representative from Ethiopian Investment Holdings (EIH) emphasized that state-owned enterprises must serve as pillars of efficiency and inclusiveness if Ethiopia is to realize the full potential of its mining sector.

“The state should exercise ownership in the interest of the general public,” the representative noted, stressing that the ultimate purpose is not short-term profit but “to maximize long-term value to society in an efficient and sustainable manner.” According to EIH, this requires the state to continually evaluate and disclose the rationale behind its ownership of enterprises engaged in mining and related industries.

‎The official underlined that the government’s role as owner cannot be passive.

“The state should act as an informed and active owner,” he said, arguing that governance of SOEs in mining must be carried out in a transparent and accountable manner. Professionalism and effectiveness, he added, are “not optional but essential if SOEs are to deliver on national development priorities.” For Ethiopia, where mineral resources are increasingly tied to foreign exchange generation and industrial inputs, inefficient state stewardship risks undermining the broader economic reform agenda.

‎EIH also argued that SOEs must compete on a fair basis, not through protected monopolies or regulatory advantages. “There should be a level playing field and fair competition in the marketplace,” the representative said, noting that the state’s role as owner must be clearly separated from its regulatory and policy-making functions. This distinction, he explained, is critical to avoid conflicts of interest that could distort investment flows or discourage private participation in mining.

‎On issues of integrity, the EIH official called for SOEs to be held to the highest possible standards.

“State enterprises in mining should observe high standards of transparency, accountability, and integrity,” he said. To build investor confidence, they should also be “subject to the same accounting, disclosure, compliance, and auditing standards as publicly listed companies.”

Such reforms, according to him, would help align Ethiopia’s mining SOEs with global practices while ensuring they remain accountable to citizens as ultimate stakeholders.

‎The flaw of exclusion came into sharp focus when the Afar Mining Corporation presented its challenges.

‎Documents presented by corporate representatives indicated that on the ground, the law’s abstract provisions mean little. Environmental impact assessments may be written, but pastoralists displaced from their land cannot invoke them as rights.

‎The proclamation acknowledges environmental standards but does not grant citizens legal standing to demand them. For Afar, this is not merely a gap in the law but a lived reality: a framework that protects investors while abandoning communities.

‎Oromia’s case, presented later in the day, showed the opposite flaw: the absence of legal recognition for good practice. The region has experimented with revenue allocation to woredas and mechanisms for community oversight. These efforts represent progress and have reduced local tensions. Yet they are extra-legal innovations, not rights. The Mining Proclamation neither requires nor protects them. They depend on political will and could disappear with a change in policy. Oromia’s best practices reveal the law’s incompleteness. It is too rigid in centralizing control and too absent when it comes to empowering innovation, stakeholders contend.

‎These contradictions of centralization, opacity, SOE privilege, community exclusion, and regional improvisation noted by the participants all point back to the same flaw: a law that was not designed for inclusivity.

‎Nemera Gebeyehu (PhD), head of the Oromia Mining Development Authority, observes Ethiopia’s mining law was written with yesterday’s priorities in mind and that the sector needs reform.

The representative from Oromia Mining, on the other hand, points out that mining laws are designed around attracting foreign investors, centralizing authority, and securing control over resources.

‎Experts agree that the absence of legal guarantees for regions and communities does not simply inconvenience them rather it holds the capacity to fuel protest, conflict, and resentment.

‎The workshop’s final session on policy recommendations made the demands clear. Participants called for a new proclamation that enshrines revenue-sharing formulas, codifies community rights, introduces free, prior, and informed consent, and imposes strict accountability on state-owned enterprises. They insisted on binding transparency clauses for contracts and revenues, not voluntary disclosures. And they urged the creation of legal mechanisms for federal-regional dispute resolution, so that conflicts are managed through law rather than protest. For most of the participants, these are not marginal reforms. They are structural corrections, necessary if Ethiopia is to reconcile its federal design with its extractive ambitions, according to the representatives of the regions.

Nonetheless, the prevailing practice across Africa, including Ethiopia, tells a different story. In many cases, both the finance and revenue ministries are primarily involved in mobilizing resources. The glaring reality of mission drift amidst thinning development finance sources was a central topic of discussion for Africans over the past week.

The 11th edition of the African Think Tank Summit opened in Addis Ababa on October 8, bringing together more than 300 think tanks, policymakers, civil society representatives, private sector leaders, and development partners from over 50 countries.

Themed ‘From Taxation to Action: Bridging Policy and Implementation in Public Financial Management (PFM) in Africa,’ the Summit delved into a topic pressing to African economies: dropping tax to GDP ratios and widening deficits in development financing. 

The three-day event was organized at the Sheraton Addis hotel by the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) in partnership with the African Union Commission (AUC) and the African Leadership Excellence Academy (AFLEX). It enjoyed support from the Hewlett Foundation and the World Bank Group, hosted by Ethiopia through the Ministry of Finance, with additional partnership from AUDA-NEPAD and UNECA.

The summit echoed the disparity between tax potential and actual collections across African economies. Experts concluded that Africa is relying more on donors and credit as domestic resource mobilization wanes. The issue is clearly one that is weighing on the continent’s political leaders, as improving domestic resource mobilization has been the theme and top agenda for past AU summits as well.

“Taxation is a sign of civilization. Developed nations like the US and China depend on tax. But Africa has been relying on donors’ money and borrowing for its development financing,” said Zadig Abrha, AFLEX president, as he made his opening remarks. . 

Mamadou Biteye, executive secretary of ACBF, is also worried about Africa’s growing development finance demand and waning resource mobilization.

 “Twenty-two African economies are currently in debt distress. Debt constitutes 66.8 percent of African GDP. Africa is losing two to five percent of its GDP to climate impact. Modernizing tax systems, reforming and enforcing laws, is crucial for Africa to improve domestic resource mobilization. Investing in sustainable capacity, leveraging technology and building resilient institutions are also key,” said Biteye.

He observed that Africa’s tax system is mired in various challenges arising both from governments and the taxpayers. 

“Structural bottlenecks in Africa’s tax system also persist. The large informal sector, institutional weaknesses, narrow tax base, limited accountability, corruption and low compliance are among the outstanding factors for Africa’s low tax-to-GDP. The deficit between potential tax and actual tax collection is wide in African economies. Governments also must improve public service deliveries to improve tax. Tax is not just a necessity but also sovereignty, freedom. Tax should not be a burden, but a covenant between citizens and governments,” said Biteye.

Fikadu Tsega is a former state minister of Justice who was recently appointed to lead the Ethiopian Policy Studies Institute (PSI), a think tank that undertakes research and forwards policy inputs to government decision makers. He is also concerned about the issue.

“The success of Agenda2063 hinges on our ability and success in domestic resource mobilization. Africa is home to 30 percent of global minerals and 60 percent of arable land, among others. But Africa has the lowest tax to GDP ratio,” he said.

Fikadu notes there are a myriad of factors stemming from both the government and taxpayers that are contributing to low revenue mobilization.

“Weak administration, evasion, diversion, informal economy, mismanagement in procurement, opaque resource utilization, and political economy challenges are contributing. Public trust in governments remains limited, especially when resources are mismanaged. A robust, equitable, fair and transparent tax system is critical,” said Fikadu.

Holy Ranaivozanany, deputy executive director of the Africa-Europe Foundation (AEF), warned that African economies can no longer count on external sources of finance given the ongoing upheavals in the global order.

“A paradigm shift is a must at this uncertain time, from a donor mindset to co-investment and self-sufficiency,” said Ranaivozanany.

Aynalem Nigussie, minister of Revenue, shares the concerns.

“Policy on its own is insufficient. Institutional capacity and political commitment matters. Robust and sustainable public finance management [PFM] matters. Tax must reflect in public service delivery, public development, and poverty reduction. Broadening the tax base and strengthening the social contract between citizens and government is critical. Robust PFM is key for Africa’s sovereignty. In the past six years, Ethiopia has registered significant tax revenue by introducing tax reforms under the overarching HGER. Debt management also improved. More tax revisions are underway,” said Aynalem.

While most speakers at the event, especially those representing governments, pushed for increased taxation, other experts have their reservations, warning that a blind push towards more tax revenue can have dire consequences.

Prof. Njuguna Ndung’u, senior advisor at the Trade and Development Bank Group, is one of the latter. Hailed as the architect of Kenya’s economy, Ndung’u is also  involved with major organizations like UNECA and AfDB, among others.

“The big question in Africa’s development is how to finance infrastructure. For the private sector, financing infrastructure is unfeasible because of its low profit. So, taxation must improve so that governments finance infrastructure. To do this, tax optimization is crucial. The problem is, when taxation distorts markets. When taxation increases, it distorts markets and goods start flowing to the informal market. Domestic debt is also not an option for African governments. It only crowds out the private sector. Instead, African governments should devise ways to involve financial institutions in domestic resource mobilization. This creates crowding-in, which is good. More taxation will also lead citizens to suffer,” he said.

Ndung’u sees public-private partnership (PPP) as the ideal solution.

“The private sector has capital, and technology. But the private sector is very cautious when it comes to time and returns. African economies also need to eye taxing the digital era economy. Digital ID is just the first step,” said the expert.

However, people with experience in tax administration say the work is easier said than done.

“Macro-stability and economic transformation are the two most difficult challenges of African economies. There are many challenges to tax reform. Structural adjustment is difficult. Most ministries of finance in Africa are busy with mobilizing resources. They are hardly working on economic development, and solving development challenges. They are not crafting strategic visions. Formalizing the informal sectors is also a challenge. In general, things are improving in Africa, but not sufficient,” says Hakim Ben Hammouda, former Tunisian minister of Finance and president of Global Institute 4 Transitions (GI4T).

Ndung’u says that high tax rates are unlikely to generate high tax revenue.

“Optimizing all tax instruments is crucial. African economies are struggling with a tax-to-GDP ratio stagnating at around 17 percent on average. Structural issues matter. Economies must be vibrant to increase tax collections. Otherwise, recession also bites. Can taxation incentivize tax collection? Yes, but if tax instruments are optimized. Digitization, open up, expanding tax base, reform, and levying reasonable tax rates are crucial to optimize tax tools,” said the expert.

Dr. Christiane Abou-Lehaf, head of international cooperation at Afrexim Bank, has a different opinion. During the summit this week, she argued that the government’s tax ambitions cannot succeed without fairly involving the private sector and improving the service side for the taxpayer.

“For instance in this summit, private sector representatives and also local financial institutions should have been participating,” she observed.

Other experts also argue that the public, particularly those in the tax net, are being overtaxed and warn of deepening poverty and discouraging businesses for the sake of collecting more taxes. Scholars also argue that there is no ‘huge uncollected tax potential in the economy’ as governments and policy makers claim. They note that the more the public and businesses lose trust in governments, the less tax comes to government coffers, calling for fundamental renewals of social contract terms.

Where Does Ethiopia Fit?

Ethiopia is home to one of the lowest tax-to-GDP ratios in the world, lower than the 17 percent and 22 percent average for Africa and globally, respectively. However, this is at odds with the country’s fast growing tax collection.

In terms of data, Ethiopia’s tax-to-GDP ratio went up to 12.4 percent in 2015, before nosediving to 7.5 percent in 2023, according to a detailed document released by the Ministry of Finance last August. The document is dubbed ‘Ethiopia’s tax-to-GDP ratio: Benchmark estimation and performance analysis.’

“This means that 7.5 Birr out of every 100 Birr earned in Ethiopia were collected by the government in the form of tax. This was less than other sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. In the same year, Uganda’s tax-to-GDP ratio was 13.1 percent, Kenya’s was 15.2 percent, and Rwanda’s was 15.7 percent. The median of all other SSA countries was 13.2 percent (in 2021). Ethiopia collects substantially less than other SSA countries in direct taxes, VAT and excise duties,” states the document.

But in real terms, Ethiopia’s actual tax collection has grown substantially. In the 2024/25 fiscal year, the government collected 700 billion Birr in tax revenue. Under Aynalem, the Ministry of Revenue targets the one trillion Birr milestone in the current fiscal year.

Despite the growth, tax revenue is far from enough to cover the ballooning federal budget, which this year is nearly two trillion Birr (USD 14.6 billion). The government is largely relying on domestic debts, treasury bills (T-bills), government bonds, and non-concessional loans to fill the budget deficit. Approximately two-thirds of the budget deficit (416.8 billion Birr) is expected to be financed through domestic sources, primarily via T-bills.

The Finance Ministry’s analysis attributes the dwindling tax-to-GDP ratio to low GDP per capita, high share of agriculture in GDP, low share of urbanization, low urbanization rate, uncollected excises and VAT on fuel, absence of excises on airtime data on financial transactions, and low VAT rate, among others.

The low revenues have led the government to introduce a barrage of new tax instruments and also raise rates on existing tax lines over the past year.

The northern war also had a substantial effect on tax collection, according to the Ministry. In 2019/20, tax collection by the Tigray regional administration accounted for 0.16 percent of Ethiopia’s GDP. This figure fell by more than half during the first year of conflict, and then again to 0.04 percent in 2021/22, according to the Ministry.

Tax revenues in neighboring regions, which were also affected by the war, also fell. In Afar, collection fell from 0.04 percent of GDP in 2020/21 to 0.01 percent by 2023. In Amhara, it dropped from 0.4 percent of GDP to 0.36.

The analysis also notes that large taxpaying entities in Tigray, such as EFFORT, had all but stopped paying taxes by 2022.

“As there are likely many other companies outside the EFFORT portfolio that were exposed to the Tigrayan conflict, looking at the EFFORT group gives us a lower-bound estimate of the true impact of the conflict on companies based outside Tigray that have operations in Tigray,” it reads.

The Ministry also proposes that Ethiopia’s low tax-to-GDP ratio could stem from inflated GDP figures.

“A final possible reason for a low tax-to-GDP ratio is that GDP – the denominator – is overstated. For instance, if GDP was in fact 10 percent lower than officially measured, the true tax-to-GDP ratio in 2022/23 would be 8.3 percent rather than the official 7.5 percent. If GDP had become increasingly overstated in recent years – in other words, if GDP growth had been overstated – this could also explain (part of) the decline in the tax-to-GDP ratio,” it reads.

There are many reasons why GDP or GDP growth may have been overstated, reads MoF document.

The process of GDP measurement is difficult in a country with a large agricultural sector and a large informal sector, so GDP growth may simply have been inaccurately measured, according to the analysis.

More problematically, there may have been political pressure to make statistical choices that boosted measured GDP, or outright data manipulation, it notes.

Tax officials collected 165 billion Birr in 2014/15. This jumped to 636 billion Birr in 2022/23. During this period, GDP surged from 1.3 trillion Birr to 8.7 trillion Birr.

Last month, the UN conducted its 80th general assembly. Heads of state and government and diplomatic envoys from all 193 member states convened in New York for the three-week marathon event.

They discussed global, regional and national issues ranging from development and climate to security, geopolitics, and uncertainties in the global order. This time around, the theme was ‘Better Together: 80 years and more for peace, development, and human rights.’

The assembly took place amid mounting pressure on the UN for its failure to live up its foundational principles and aims. Its inability to resolve the wars in Sudan, Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere, or respond to calls for reform from the global south have placed the UN under fire.

Despite the growing criticism, the UN remains the principal stage where states can echo their concerns—perceived, real, or fabricated. However, the endless debates and motions at UNGA80, as with so many of the assemblies that came before it, are unlikely to result in a peaceful resolution of differences through dialogue.

For Ethiopia, the assembly coincided with a spike in tensions with Egypt following the inauguration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and continuing friction with Eritrea as the administration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed presses ahead with its campaign for maritime access.

UNGA80 served as a spotlight on Egypt and Eritrea’s position towards Ethiopia, highlighted glaring contradictions in their arguments, and signaled expectations that the geopolitical spiral in the Horn of Africa is unlikely to resolve itself in the near future.

Ethiopia’s interest in direct access to the Red Sea, particularly revolving around the Port of Assab, has been a dominant talking point over the past few weeks.

The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) recently issued a statement asserting Ethiopia’s interests in Assab, and government officials have been busy substantiating all the legal, historical, and national interest factors they believe can bring sea access within reach.

Asmara and its officials view the rhetoric as inflammatory. During the assembly, Osman Saleh, Eritrea’s foreign minister, described Ethiopia’s interest in Assab as a “reckless and expansionist ambition.” 

Osman spoke repeatedly about Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions during UNGA80, but at times his statements seemed to contradict themselves.

“Eritrea wishes to reaffirm that it is a sovereign coastal state, and its ports are national assets. Any arrangements for their use, whether commercial or logistical, are matters to be negotiated directly and bilaterally between Eritrea and the partner of its choosing. Its ports are not open for foreign military or naval use, and that mediation by external powers is neither legally required nor politically acceptable. Access by a landlocked state is not automatic, nor does it require mediation by third parties. International law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and customary norms, recognizes the principle of sovereign control over ports,” he stated during one session.

In another, he expressed Asmara’s willingness for a commercial partnership on fair and equal terms, and said Eritrea’s ports remain open to legitimate trade. He also said that Eritrea is committed to the Awaza Programme of Action for Landlocked Developing Countries, a UN program aimed at supporting the development aspirations of 32 landlocked nations in Africa, Asia, Europe, and South America.

While rejecting Ethiopia’s quest for maritime access, Eritrea claims to support a UN program on equitable sea access.

Contradictory statements were also part of the debate between Ethiopian and Egyptian representatives at UNGA80. GERD’s inauguration last month has sparked frustration in Cairo, and during the assembly 14 years of tensions were laid bare.

An Egyptian representative said the GERD’s inauguration was a “unilateral measure devoid of any legal legitimacy” and argued the dam violated international law and UNSC statements. Egypt went further, accusing Ethiopia of causing several regional conflicts.

“Ethiopia signed an MoU with secessionist forces threatening the unity and sovereignty of Somalia. Ethiopia attacked Sudan’s borders repeatedly, for illicit resource exploitation in the contested al-Fashaga region. Ethiopia waged war on Eritrea, seized the Eritrean border illegally, and is now maintaining threats to Eritrea over access to the Red Sea. Ethiopia removed its peacekeeping forces from UNISFA. Ethiopia is deploying troops in Somalia outside the AU framework. This is Ethiopia, not Egypt,” said the rep.

Cairo argued that Addis Ababa’s rhetoric stemmed from “a troubled internal situation” and attempts to manufacture enemies for domestic consumption.

The Egyptian representative wrapped up with an open-ended conclusion, stating that Cairo would use “all necessary means” under international law to protect its interests.

In response, Ethiopian representatives argued that Addis Ababa maintains the same position it has since the dam was launched 14 years ago. They stated that Ethiopia has a right to use its resources for development with respect to the rights of riparian countries.

Ethiopia’s representative hailed GERD as a symbol of resilience not only for Ethiopians but also for Africans, and accused Egypt for hobbling negotiations surrounding the dam “in bad faith.” Ethiopia firmly rejected what it described as unfounded claims made by Egypt regarding GERD at UNGA80.

Ethiopia’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Yoseph Kassaye, exercised the Right of Reply in response to remarks delivered by Egypt’s representative in the assembly’s general debate.

He underscored that Egypt’s claims against the GERD have also been communicated to the UN Security Council, despite being baseless and misleading. Ethiopia, he said, has consistently provided responses grounded in truth, principle, and international law.

“The stark contrast between Ethiopia’s long-standing policy of cooperation and Egypt’s continued hostility is clear,” Yoseph told the assembly, stressing that Ethiopia’s position on the Nile is anchored in the international principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.

Ethiopia criticized Egypt for attempting to impose so-called “historic rights” rooted in colonial-era treaties that excluded most Nile Basin countries.

“While Ethiopia seeks to develop the Nile to uphold the basic human rights of its people, access to clean water, food security, and electricity, Egypt insists on denying these necessities through outdated claims of monopoly over the river,” the Ambassador said.

He also recalled that Ethiopia had engaged Egypt throughout the GERD’s planning and construction process, in contrast to Egypt’s unilateral construction of the Aswan High Dam, which displaced communities and destroyed the remnants of ancient civilizations.

Despite multiple rounds of negotiations, Egypt has repeatedly sought unreasonable concessions without demonstrating genuine interest in a mutually beneficial agreement.

“Egypt’s entire focus has been to extract recognition of colonial-era entitlements and secure absolute control over the Nile Basin,” Yoseph stated.

Highlighting Ethiopia’s commitment to peace and regional integration, he accused Egypt of undermining these efforts by fueling instability in neighboring countries through arms shipments and political interference.

“There is no parallel comparison between Ethiopia and Egypt. Our determination to cooperate comes from the just nature of our cause and the shared future we envision with our neighbors,” he emphasized.

Ethiopia further criticized Egypt for attempting to internationalize the GERD issue, calling it “an effort to exploit the UN platform for narrow political purposes and to deflect attention from its own internal and regional challenges.”

Concluding his remarks, Yoseph called on Egypt to abandon hostile approaches and instead play a constructive role in fostering regional cooperation. .

The UNGA exchange showed that the GERD is no longer just about electricity or irrigation. It has become the focal point of competing narratives about sovereignty, regional stability, and Africa’s future.

As usual, UNGA80 served as a talking platform, not a firm, truthful, impartial place for solutions to emerge.

In the days and weeks since Ethiopia launched its gigantic hydropower project, the GERD, news of its ambitions for an even bigger nuclear energy project has gripped public attention. While realizing a nuclear power asset would be an impressive milestone in the country’s development aspirations, the buzz around the plans has sparked debate over whether going nuclear is rational in the face of vast untapped renewable energy potential, particularly in hydropower.

Ethiopia’s growing interest in nuclear power was more explicitly illustrated over the last couple of weeks, which have seen two major global atomic energy events take place.

The World Atomic Week, taking place between September 25, 2025, and September 28, is underway in Moscow, coinciding with Moscow’s celebration of the 80th anniversary of its nuclear industry. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) and Ethiopia’s ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance were among the attendees at World Atomic Week—the largest global event dedicated to the nuclear sector and related industries.

Just a week before the gathering in Moscow, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) organized its 69th general conference in Vienna, Austria. Belete Mola, minister of Innovation and Technology, led the Ethiopian delegation at this event.

On Thursday, on the sidelines in Moscow, Russia and Ethiopia inked an agreement for an action plan to develop a nuclear power plant project in the African country, Russia’s TASS news agency reported. The deal follows statements made by the PM during the inauguration of GERD, when he publicly disclosed his administration’s plans for a large nuclear power station.

Alexey Likhachev, head of Russia’s state atomic energy corporation Rosatom, and Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timotheos signed papers and exchanged documents in the presence of PM Abiy and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Both sides highlighted cooperation in energy and infrastructure.

The signing comes more than eight years after Ethiopia and Russia first signed an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in 2017, laying the groundwork for broader collaboration in nuclear science, technology, and education.

The document signed between Ethiopia and Russia calls for the planning and construction of a nuclear power plant.

An action plan on development and construction of the facility was signed during a nuclear power forum by Rosatom chief Likhachev, and Ashebir Balcha, CEO of Ethiopian Electric Power (EEP), according to Russian media RIA.

The two sides have reportedly agreed to create a detailed construction plan and a “road map” for the technical and economic foundation of the project and an intergovernmental agreement to proceed. The agreement also calls for training for staff in operating the plant and developing the nuclear sector.

Nonetheless, Ethiopia’s ambition to introduce nuclear power to its energy mix will take at least a decade to realize, according to statements made by government officials during the IAEA conference in Geneva.

Tech Minister Belete expressed gratitude to the Agency and its Director-General Rafael Grossi for a pledge to support Ethiopia’s plans for nuclear energy over the coming decade.

Following a visit to Addis Ababa in June, the IAEA Director-General announced the Agency would work with the Ethiopian government to introduce nuclear power by 2035 and pledged to supply equipment that will allow Tikur Anbessa, Ethiopia’s oldest and largest public hospital, to offer radiation therapy to cancer patients.

The Agency is already working with the government to operationalize a linear accelerator (LINAC) device from Siemens Health at the hospital.

During the Moscow event this week, PM Abiy underscored that Ethiopia has already taken concrete steps, with a roadmap developed in partnership with the Russian Federation to build nuclear infrastructure, train personnel, and strengthen regulatory frameworks.

The premier said Ethiopia stands at the pivotal moment.

“Our youths are vibrant, our cities are modernizing, our industries are growing and our economy is among the fastest rising in the world. But our ambitions are higher—ambitions that demand reliable, clean and scalable energy. Hydropower, solar and wind have carried us far. Yet alone, they cannot power the future we are building,” said Abiy.

The PM noted that Ethiopia’s ambitions for green energy and development have moved beyond GERD.

“Our vision goes beyond today. To transform our nation, we look ahead and embrace what is possible,” he said.

If realized, Ethiopia will become one of very few African countries who harness nuclear power for peaceful development in their renewable energy mix. The initiative also marks BRICS member countries’ commitment to collaborate in multiple development areas.

So far, South Africa is the only country in Africa with an operational nuclear power plant, but reactors are under construction in Egypt. Recently, Niger’s mining minister, Ousmane Abarchi, said his country wanted to build two 2,000-megawatt nuclear reactors in partnership with Rosatom.

Noting that nuclear technology is a possibility, Abiy argued it provides reliable low low-emission power, strengthens food security, equips doctors, optimizes water management, and empowers scientists to innovate.

The PM contends that for Ethiopia, nuclear power is not only about energy, but about people. His administration hopes to see it provide tools for farmers and bring healing to patients.

“We will pursue this responsibly with careful planning, the highest safety standards, and by building strong local capacity. For us, nuclear power is the strategic step in becoming an active participant in artificial intelligence, in industry and innovation,” Abiy noted.

 “With more than 130 million people, we cannot afford to wait. Nuclear energy is essential to secure long-term development, diversify our energy mix, and realize Ethiopia’s potential.”

PM Abiy further elaborated that Ethiopia has already taken concrete steps, a roadmap with the Russian Federation lays out plans to build nuclear infrastructure, train personnel, and strengthen regulatory frameworks.

A Nuclear Science and Technology Center is about to be established, and cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear science is expanding, he further stated.

“We are building the institutions, training talent, and designing a future where nuclear energy strengthens our sovereignty, supports our growth, and serves the next generation,” he said.

The premier stated that Ethiopia is committed to partnerships based on trust, knowledge, and mutual respect, adding “We welcome cooperation and technology transfer, and safety training and reflect the realities of our economies.”

Reflecting on the centuries-old diplomatic ties between Ethiopia and Russia, President Putin hailed the agreements as a big achievement.

“Ethiopia is our long-standing reliable partner in Africa. Our relations are making steady progress, and trade is growing. The intergovernmental commission is working effectively. We have good cooperation in humanitarian areas, above all, training specialists,” he said.

Referring to PM Abiy at the Moscow nuclear conference, Putin also stated “Mr Prime Minister, we remain in constant contact, and we are genuinely pleased to see your representative delegation. Earlier this year, our delegation visited Ethiopia. I am aware that you had an in-person meeting with its head, and I would like to thank you for that. Overall, our relations are gaining momentum across all areas, and we are very pleased that things are going that way. Once again, welcome. We are very pleased to see you.”

Historically, the use of nuclear energy surged after the 1970s oil crisis, promising a stable and efficient power source. However, high-profile accidents like Three Mile Island in 1979, Chernobyl in 1986, and Fukushima in 2011 triggered global reevaluation. Countries like Germany have since initiated plans to phase out nuclear power, shifting attention to renewable alternatives.

Nuclear energy is produced through nuclear fission—primarily with uranium—by splitting the nucleus of an atom into smaller parts. In nuclear reactors, uranium-235 atoms are bombarded with neutrons, which cause them to split, releasing heat energy and additional neutrons. These neutrons continue to trigger fission in other uranium atoms, creating a sustained chain reaction.

The heat generated is used to produce steam that drives turbines to generate electricity. This process yields a massive energy output from a small amount of fuel. While this can seem like an effective way to continually and reliably generate energy, nuclear energy does have several disadvantages.

Yet even with those disadvantages, nations in Asia like China and India have invested heavily in nuclear power to meet their growing energy demands.

Some of the advantages include exceptionally high energy density, minimal greenhouse gas emission, reliability to run continuously, reduced dependence on fossil fuels, and improved energy security. On the other hand, nuclear energy also brings with it hazardous radioactive waste and byproducts from nuclear reactors, which remain dangerous to people and the environment for thousands of years.

Safe, long-term disposal solutions, such as deep geological repositories, are complex and expensive, posing environmental and logistical challenges. This means that nearly all of the world’s existing nuclear waste is stored in temporary facilities. As more radioactive waste is produced, new storage facilities must be constructed.

High investment cost is another disadvantage. Some researchers estimate the average investment cost of one nuclear plant at USD 7.5  billion.

The risk of nuclear accidents, especially the explosion of a nuclear power plant, is another disadvantage, which could carry disastrous consequences.

Accessing uranium, which is a primary fuel for nuclear reactors, is also an issue. Uranium is scarce and accessing it often risks geopolitical feuds in the global power struggle, meaning that sourcing uranium typically requires political backing and generosity from friendly nations.

Ashma passionately explains the 270 million year old subtropical plateau and its iconic jagged stone structures were once underwater. Today, the forest is a UNESCO World Natural Heritage Site and enjoys the highest 5A rating from China’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism.

Ashma’s name, too, is part of the rich heritage in Yunnan: she shares it with an age-old narrative poem about the struggle between light and darkness. Today, Ashma narrates the stories of Yunnan to the hundreds of international and domestic tourists roaming around the forest at any given minute.

Just 90 kilometers away from the tourist site, a global meeting is underway in the splendid Kunming city, seat of the Yunnan provincial administration. Also known as the Spring City, Kunming is famous for its natural endowments, several UNESCO-registered assets, year-round fair weather, and a bustling hospitality and service scene.

Earlier this month, Kunming played host to around 500 journalists, scholars, government officials, and entrepreneurs from 110 countries and a slew of international and regional organizations. They were in the Spring City for the 2025 Global South Media and Think Tank Forum organized jointly by the Xinhua News Agency and the Yunnan provincial administration.

The Forum brought together media executives, think-tank researchers and policymakers from across Africa, Asia, Latin America and the broader Global South. It aimed to strengthen South-South cooperation in areas such as media content, capacity-building, digital infrastructure, research collaboration, trade and development policy, and public diplomacy.

And while Kunming’s meeting halls, like the Stone Forest, were filled with foreigners, the voices echoing across them expressed not an enthusiasm for all visitors, but spoke of the dangers facing freedom, development, and peace in the Global South as a result of the west’s scramble to maintain the status quo in a unipolar global hegemony.

Forum participants discussed how to unite the Global South, end western hypocrisy, overcome the challenges posed by the global status quo, and reposition their respective nations in a fair and just global governance system.

Journalists, politicians, and scholars all provided their best analysis of current global conditions and forwarded their ideal recommendations under the Forum’s theme: Empowering the Global South, Navigating Global Challenges.

Opening the Forum, Melissa Fleming, UN under-secretary-general for global communications, stressed the importance of truth seeking media, provision of quality information, and exercising the right to freedom of expression and media freedom. She called for joint efforts to enhance global sustainability and intercultural exchanges, restore balance to the global information ecosystem, and incorporate integrity into the online public sphere.

Vincent Meriton, former vice president of Seychelles, spoke passionately about the Global South’s role in development and the obstacles posed by western dominance.

“The Global South is the driver of 21^st century development synergy. Peace is the absence of exploitation. Our sovereignty is not for sale. The new world order should be written by us, not by imperialists. We are not a cultural periphery. Practice multilateralism, be clear against hegemony. The Global South is not asking for permission to live,” he stated. 

Meriton hailed the China-proposed Global Governance Initiative (GGI) as a champion of the Global South, pushing for a more just and equitable international order. Meriton said that the GGI comes at an “opportune moment” as the world grapples with challenges including widening inequality, prolonged conflicts and climate crises.

Meanwhile, unilateral sanctions and double standards are eroding the credibility and authority of the current global governance system. Speakers at the Forum characterized GGI as a “breath of fresh air” offering “hope and encouragement” to global governance resonating widely among Global South countries.

Several other officials, leading journalists and scholars from Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and elsewhere also spoke on the major challenges facing the Global South. They stressed the need for collaboration to resolve the conflicts in Palestine, Ukraine, Sudan, among others. Addressing climate difficulties, global peace and security, underdevelopment, and many other global crises were also discussed under national, regional and global geopolitics scenarios.

“The Global South is not only a geographical designation; it shares an intertwined fate. Misinformation is going faster than real news. The digital gap between developed and developing nations is widening. The media should defend peace and development. The Global South has been marginalized by historical injustice,” said Hassan Falha, a senior official at the Lebanese Ministry of Information.

Beyond media, the Forum also aimed to foster connections between Global South nations through heritage, culture, art, and other societal values. The latter are considered key to protecting the new generations in the Global South from western propaganda and influence, according to Forum presentation materials.

Accordingly, the Forum concluded that the Global South shares not only footprints from past civilizations, but also its future, which presenters warned can only be secured by weeding out ill-fitting western values.

“As we face similar challenges, the Global South shall rise together. Silence is bad and must be replaced with south-south cooperation; synergy,” said Ambreen Jan, Pakistan’s secretary of information.

While ending western dominance in global governance was a major topic of discussion during the Forum, it also saw repeated calls for reform in global institutions like the UN, international financial agencies, and others in a way that fits and accommodates the emerging voices and interests of the Global South’s development demands.

Speakers at the Forum argued the existing system of global governance largely excludes the voices of the Global South and observed that a change is overdue as the Global South today comprises a huge portion of development contributions, human capital development and global value chains. They want to see the global governance system restructured and reformed to reflect this reality as part of the drive to guarantee equal representation to all.

“The Global South was once colonized. Now, it is rising as the most critical society in global dynamics,” said Ali Mohammed from the Nigerian News Agency.

The Forum urged the media in the Global South to uphold a common goal and prioritize defending the interests of the Global South, truth, and freedom, by expanding its horizon to include not only local issues but also on globalism.

“Global mainstream media is still clinging to a colonial-era mindset. Global fact-checking institutions are crucial. Medias must partner so voices from the Global South are heard everywhere,” said Marat Abulkhatin, a member of the 120-year-old Russian News Agency (TASS), which has a presence in 60 countries.

Zhou Ting, an expert from the University of China’s international relations department, also weighed in.

“Despite its huge weight, the Global South voice remains low. Western media are always disseminating false information, undermining the Global South’s truths. They always narrate as if the Global South’s rise is going to strike the west. The Global South needs countering media power to reverse the west’s false narrative. The Global South must reconnect to the media, think tanks, workshops, people to people, and other platforms,” said Ting.

Elizabeth Brodskaia, an editor for Russia Today (RT), stressed the importance of linguistic ties.

“Western media is diversifying its coverage and languages to those of the Global South. Global South media must do the same to counter the western narrative. This is also important to staying competitive. Our media must open new branches to cover more languages, more societies, and more audiences.  This way, the Global South can connect at cultural, information, and many levels. For instance, western media’s coverage of China is always intentionally distorted. They still maintain the colonial-era mentality. The west claims to follow liberalism. But their liberalism is racism, not freedom. China, as well as other Global South nations, has thousands of years of civilization. They don’t need to be told what to do or not by the west,” said Brodskaia.

Marine Nazaryan from ArmenPress made a similar argument.

“Shaping a shared future is a major task of the Global South nations now. The world is at a crossroads of civilization and rapidly changing global geopolitics. The Global South must seize this opportunity. Let’s move practically, beyond conventions and forums. The Global South is marginalized from global decision making. But no single culture built human civilization. The Global South is not a geographical term but a shared vision now,” she said.

Professor Joshua David Eisenman, a political science expert from the University of Notre Dame, also attended the Forum.

“America is no longer promoting democracy. Washington remains interventionist. Many Global South countries are re-evaluating their relationship with Washington. The US teaching freedom is anxiety for Beijing. Trade and technology wars between east and west are rising. Security concerns like the Taiwan case are ticking. The global power structure is showing vacuum as the US retreats, and the Global South’s voice rises. Amidst all challenges, China is asserting soft power through the media. Parallel multilateralism structures like BRICS and FOCAC are also becoming effective platforms for the global south. China is investing in these platforms,” said Eisenman.

A foreign policy scholar and member of the diplomatic community in Ethiopia spoke with The Reporter, reflecting on the Forum and current assessments of global affairs.

“The status quo, the West’s dominance era, is changing. The unipolar system is ending. New global governance must be put in place. The west has run out of world-class technocrats to lead the world. America’s current rulers and foreign policy formulators have become highly self-centered, arrogant and have failed to see global dynamism.”

“They have descended to a ‘one-size fits all’ policy, because they failed to recognize the natural interests of Global South nations like Russia, China, and others. Unless they put themselves in the shoes of the Global South, American policy makers and politicians cannot fully grasp the global dynamism. Very few American policy makers, like Henry Kissinger, were willing to try to understand what the Global South wants. America has a disdain for China, for instance. They think China is all about economy. But China has exceeded America through economic diplomacy, which is transforming into diplomatic, political and security leverages,” said the scholar, who spoke anonymously.

He foresees the global power shift is inevitable.

“The US is losing its global control hegemony. China, India, Russia are forming a strong  bloc. They are also lining up other Global South nations behind them. They are even wooing Europe. Trump is saying to Europe and emerging nations ‘you are with us or not.’ Trump is fighting hard to keep Europe in isolation rather than joining the Global South bloc. But Trump is losing heavily; losing American allies fast. He cut off all humanitarian support, including closing USAID. That damaged many connections with its operations in developing countries. Further, Trump launched a trade tariff war. America is even losing Japan due to Trump’s tariff war. It is backfiring on America itself. America is also causing conflicts and chaos around the world. All these measures indicate that America is desperate,” said the scholar.

Amidst all these foreboding signs for America and the collective west, representatives of the Global South, particularly China, are emerging as the ideal alternative to take charge, observes the diplomat.

“Global South nations, especially China, are efficiently utilizing platforms like BRICS, FOCAC and other platforms to organize the Global South. Many developing nations in the Global South are finding Chinese principles and firm development positions better than the wests’ static and mismatching values. The west seems to be preparing to hand over global leadership. Surprisingly, America is not even scanning the silent but fast shifting global governance landscape. The west utilizes language, Hollywood, propaganda, sanctions, and many other tools to control the narratives. The Global South is also doing the same to reverse the status quo. Global South media like Sputnik, Xinhua, CGTN, and others are doing this,” said the scholar.

“The influence of Global South media is not there yet, but they’re trying. South-south cooperation is gaining momentum. The west, particularly the US, has no options left. Hence, the US and Israel are creating chaos and conflict across the world, including in Ukraine, Gaza, and elsewhere. They think that if they can’t tackle the Global South’s rise, they can at least keep it tied down by conflict, instability, and war. The tactic may delay the Global South’s realization, but the coming of a new world order through the influence of the Global South is inevitable.”

He cited Washington’s blind support of Israel’s attacks on Arab nations as an example of weakening ties and waning confidence.

“America has a large military base in Qatar. But Israel pounded Qatar, and the US did not say anything. Egypt is also in fear,” said the scholar.

The 2025 Global South Media and Think Tank Forum wrapped up by underscoring the need to counter the west’s false narration, hypocrisy, and propaganda through cooperation and facts.

Ashma, the tour guide, had a similar message.

 “The Stone Forest is like a fact that takes all human beings into a different space-time reality. And reality is the same for all human beings,” she said.

It will be remembered as one where politics, economics, and public life collided in ways that reshaped the country’s trajectory. It was a year of sharp contrasts, in which bold reforms often collided with the realities on the ground and persisting resistance. It was a period where new faces in power were faced against old wounds in society, and pride in national achievements against deep anxieties about peace and stability.

The year began in the immediate wake of the government’s decision to liberalize the foreign exchange market as part of its sweeping macroeconomic reforms. Announced with plenty of fanfare on the final day of July 2024, the currency float has since seen the Birr lose more than 200 percent of its value against the US Dollar over the last 12 months.

Although the gap between parallel and official forex rates dropped down from over 100 percent to around 15 percent in the aftermath of the shift, the gap has since grown wider. Banks offered up to 139 Birr per USD at the close of 2017 E.C., while street traders in Addis Ababa reportedly offered as much as 180 Birr or even more.

Analysts contend that the difference exposes the wide credibility gap in monetary policy and the liberalization remains a hotly debated topic in coffee shops and boardrooms alike.

The float was not the only big change to start off the year.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s administration also made the landmark announcements that it would halt direct government borrowing from the central bank for the first time in recent memory, and end routine money printing — a practice long blamed by analysts and the public for fueling inflation.

The inflation rate, which sat near 33.5 percent before the IMF-backed reforms, had dropped to 13 percent by the end of 2017 E.C., according to the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE). Food prices, however, continued to dominate the inflation basket, leaving millions of households in a precarious position.

Many have hailed the decision to end direct borrowing from the central bank as the reason behind a halving of the budget deficit to under two percent of GDP. Officials cite a combination of fiscal consolidation, monetary policy reforms, and improved revenue mobilization efforts for the apparent success framing it as a milestone in restoring macroeconomic discipline.

However, businesses contend that credit has become scarcer, imports pricier, and the cost of living and survival higher.

In terms of legislation, the year saw sweeping changes to existing tax laws and the introduction of the Property Tax Proclamation. Banking laws were amended to allow foreign participation, and lawmakers approved a bill permitting foreign investors to buy up real estate in Ethiopia for the first time.

The changes were framed by the government as a turning point in Ethiopia’s efforts to attract foreign investment, but not much has transpired in the months since, with critics arguing that regulatory ambiguity and the country’s ever-fragile security and political environment render the laws impotent.

The controversial Asset Recovery Proclamation ratified by Parliament in January has empowered authorities to confiscate assets not linked to a verified source of income, with the law applying retroactively as far back as 10 years.

While some officials branded it a “historic strike against illicit wealth,” the private sector voiced serious unease about the law. The private sector cautioned it could carry unintended consequences for entrepreneurship and investment confidence. International and local watchdogs, analysts and experts alike also questioned whether the law could be weaponized against political dissent.

Likewise, the controversial revisions to the Media and Civil Society Organization proclamations have stoked fears about a shrinking civic space, despite official assurances.

On the trade front, 2017 E.C. was a notable year. Coffee and gold exports soared, while the government stepped up its efforts to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) and break into new markets, but questions remain.

Ethiopia’s membership in the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was promoted as proof of its integration into global markets, yet with logistics costs among the highest in Africa, and the country still ranked 159th out of 190 in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index, many see a long way to go before its trade ambitions are realized.

As with trade, the political arena was anything but quiet over the last 12 months.

The resignation of Getachew Reda, former president of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) and a senior figure in the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), made national headlines. His decision to quit both regional administrative and party leadership, citing irreconcilable disputes, underscored the fragility of Tigray’s post-war political order.

The subsequent establishment of a new political party by Getachew and the TPLF faction that remains loyal to him suggests that fragmentation, rather than consolidation, was defining the political landscape in Ethiopia’s northernmost region.

On the other hand, in Addis Ababa, the federal government pressed ahead with electoral reforms. Draft amendments to the Political Parties Registration and Electoral Code of Conduct Proclamation were tabled, with officials promising a level playing field ahead of the upcoming general election.

Opposition leaders have criticized the revisions as being superficial and for failing to address systemic imbalances, such as electoral board independence.

The year saw a lot of shuffling in government leadership and cabinet positions, including NBE Governor Mamo Mihretu’s resignation last week amid the implementation of the government’s ambitious monetary reforms. Mamo’s departure comes as the central bank navigates unprecedented challenges, including taming inflation, managing foreign exchange volatility, and curbing the fiscal deficit. Observers interpret his resignation as one that might put Ethiopia’s bold reform agenda in a tough spot, underscoring the high stakes and public scrutiny surrounding macroeconomic management in 2017.

Earlier in the year, Taye Atskeselassie replaced Sahle-Work Zewde as President. Taye’s rise was followed by a gush of cabinet moves. Gedion Timotheos (PhD) took the helm at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while Hanna Arayaselassie stepped in at the Justice Ministry and Adisu Arega Kitessa was unexpectedly appointed Minister of Agriculture.

The shuffling sparked speculation that the Prime Minister was both rewarding loyalty and preemptively managing rival power blocs.

Ethiopia’s security scene in 2017 was defined by both relief and anxiety. The federal government claimed progress against armed insurgencies. Reports surfaced that fighters linked to the Oromo Liberation Army (OLF-Shene) were leaving their remote strongholds, signaling possible openings for dialogue. Yet conflicts still continue in Oromia and Amhara.

The government has announced new investments in domestic arms production and drone technology, aiming to reduce dependence on imports. Officials described the move as both economic and strategic, stating that Ethiopia cannot defend sovereignty with borrowed guns.

Still, fragility remains the status quo.

In Amhara, irregular clashes between Fano militia and federal troops persist. In Tigray, discontent simmers under the surface, amplified by Getachew Reda’s resignation and the appointment of Lt. Gen. Tadesse Werede as the new head of TIA. In Oromia, the fight with OLF-Shane still goes on.

Meanwhile, mass displacement has remained a challenge with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimating over 2.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) nationwide by the end of the year.

Beyond conflicts, displacements and migration, natural shocks added to insecurity. Ethiopia recorded its highest number of seismic tremors in decades. Several quakes above 4.0 were felt in Addis Ababa and while damage has been limited, the psychological effect was significant in a country already on edge.

On the diplomacy front, the balance between pride and pressure defined Ethiopia’s policies and achievements in 2017.

Most notable was the completion and subsequent inauguration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) 15 years after its cornerstone was laid. Images of the massive dam’s full operation sparked nationwide celebrations, with government officials and the public alike hailing it as a symbol of resilience and sovereignty; a second Adwa.

But behind the festivities, relations with Egypt and Sudan remain strained. Egyptian officials have accused Ethiopia of jeopardizing their water security, while Addis Ababa has insisted on its sovereign right to develop.

WTO accession talks were revived with a target of February 2026. Ethiopia also took part in the BRICS Summit in Brazil, underscoring its desire to diversify partnerships beyond traditional Western allies.

However, relations with neighboring Eritrea soured further. President Isaias Afwerki’s repeated speeches, often transmitted as live broadcasts on Eritrean state television, accused Ethiopia of neo-colonial dependency and threatened renewed confrontation. Eritrea’s outreach to Egypt, Somalia, and Sudan fueled speculation of a counter-Ethiopian alliance. Addis Ababa downplayed the rhetoric publicly.

Ethiopia’s diplomatic balancing act was further tested by global alignments. Western donors pressed harder on human rights and governance reforms, while China and Turkey expanded economic footprints, financing infrastructure and manufacturing projects. Analysts described Ethiopia’s diplomacy as walking cautiously in an effort to keep the relationship balance between old patrons and new suitors.

In 2017, despite turbulence, Ethiopians found moments of unity. The launch of GERD provided one such moment, as did national mourning for migrants lost in Yemen’s waters. The year closed with Ethiopia still restless and reforming. Its economy bears the scars of inflation but showed tentative discipline. Its politics mixed with resignations and reshuffles, yet opened new debates about reform. Its security held, but under constant simmering tensions. And its diplomacy projected ambition even as tensions with neighbors loomed. As the year ended, Ethiopia remained a nation in motion, refusing to be still.

Since its announcement as “Project X,” the GERD has faced staunch opposition from Egypt, which has historically relied on colonial-era treaties to claim near-total control over the Nile’s waters. Cairo has employed a wide array of tactics, from lobbying international financial institutions to deny funding to raising the issue at the United Nations Security Council, framing the dam as an existential threat to regional security.

Now, as Ethiopia prepares to inaugurate the much anticipated project, a debate emerges over what comes next.

Some within Ethiopia argue the dam’s successful completion, without reducing water flow to downstream nations, invalidates Egypt’s core arguments and will see tensions between the two countries cool off.

Others predict the inauguration will be the beginning of an even more tense relationship between Addis Ababa and Cairo. After a decade of focus on the dam’s finalization, Ethiopia’s plans for GERD post-completion are also a subject of interest.

Will Ethiopia build additional dams on the Abay River in its tributaries? Will Ethiopia use the river for irrigation? Will the dam enhance Ethiopia’s diplomatic influence and reposition its interests in fast-changing regional and global geopolitics?

These questions and more hang up in the air ahead of the inauguration ceremony. As far as Ethiopian officials are concerned, the matter is done and dusted.

“The age of [shrinking] is over,” said Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) during an interview with state-affiliated media, filmed on-site with the dam’s massive spillway in full view.

Aregawi Berhe (PhD), a veteran political figure serving as Director-General of the Public Participation Coordination Office for the GERD, equates the national effort behind the construction of the dam to the historic victory at Adwa, calling it a “symbol of Ethiopian unity” funded by over 23.6 billion Birr in public contributions.

“The victory at Adwa was the outcome of the anger and indignation in Ethiopian hearts at the time. GERD is the same. GERD is the second victory at Adwa. GERD is a symbol of Ethiopian unity. We just built Africa’s biggest hydropower dam,” said Aregawi.

He believes the dam will prove favorable for Ethiopia’s diplomatic standing, asserting its completion nullifies arguments for unrecognized colonial-era water treaties and proves that claims made against the dam by downstream countries were baseless.

“We proved Ethiopia’s development cannot be determined by foreign pressure, but by its own citizens,” said Aregawi. “GERD is now finished. Water flow to Egypt was never interrupted. This falsified Egypt’s pretexts. The world also sided with Egypt. International financial institutions refused to finance us. They tried to keep Ethiopia on aid recipient mode. None of all the aid and grants took Ethiopia anywhere.”

He believes the dam signals a shift in how development is approached.

“We proved we can grow on our own. We just started a new development paradigm. Foreign powers can no longer pull strings in the name of development,” said Aregawi.

In-kind and labor contributions bring the total value of public contribution to GERD to around 86 billion Birr, according to the Director-General, who thanked members of their diaspora for their contributions and lobbying efforts.

“GERD is a great example for African nations who were unable to utilize their resources due to colonial powers. They can achieve their development,” said Aregawi.

Professor Yacob Arsano is a leading expert on hydro-politics in Ethiopia who played an important role in negotiations and talks surrounding GERD since the project’s inception. He shares Aregawi’s optimism for Ethiopia’s future prospects and provides a more detailed account of friction with Egypt over the past 14 years.

“My projection regarding future relations between Ethiopia and Egypt is that the tensions between the two countries will settle down. Ethiopia has finalized its work. GERD is finalized. So I believe the diplomatic tension will drop from now on, compared to the tension we have been witnessing so far,” he said.

Yacob described talks surrounding GERD as “always intense” and admonished Egypt for “working relentlessly” to turn the dam into a regional and global security issue on the international stage.

Ethiopia was forced to appear before the UN Security Council dozens of times as a result of Cairo’s unyielding lobbying.

“GERD negotiations were always intense. We cannot say the GERD negotiations were actually  full-fledged negotiations per se because the Egyptians couldn’t come up with tangible and concrete points of discussion during the sessions. They always came to push their own interests and enforce that one-sided interest as a principle,” Yacob told The Reporter.

He noted the Declaration of Principles (DoP) signed by Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan in Khartoum in March 2015 as being one of the only examples of genuine cooperation.

“Negotiations [for the DoP] took four months,” said Yacob, pointing out that even this agreement had issues. “In general, it was good.”

The rest of it, however, was anything but.

“I’ve been part of GERD and all its ups and downs for the past thirteen years. The biggest challenge since its inception has been the rigidness of Egypt and its relentless selfish attempts to pressure Ethiopia into an illogical agreement,” said the expert. “All throughout, Egypt stuck to an old narrative. They did everything to persuade the world; to paint a picture of Egypt as a victim of GERD.”

Egypt’s comparatively vast resources enabled it to enlist media, lobbyists, and people with political influence for its cause, while Ethiopia lacked the institutional capacity and experience to counter the false narratives, according to Yacob.

“Yet, Ethiopia managed to lead the negotiation with capable, consistent and principled negotiators. Ethiopia’s negotiation team never intended to harm Egypt, but also never lost sight of Ethiopia’s burning interest. Ethiopia never had the intention to harm Egypt, nor to reduce the water volume. Egypt’s water levels did not during any of the filings. Sudan also benefited from the regulated flow of the Nile having previously been affected by flooding,” said the expert.

With inauguration day fast approaching, Independent Ethiopian scholars who are outside the government’s framework of thought caution the political ordeal surrounding GERD is likely to grow worse.

A scholar and member of the diplomatic community who spoke to The Reporter anonymously is among those who foresee heightened tensions with Egypt.

“Ethiopia considers the completion of GERD as a green light to build more dams on Abay and even use the river for agricultural projects in the future. Other riparian countries will also start doing the same. This is what Egypt fears. Even more than GERD. Therefore, Egypt will escalate its tactics to achieve three targets. Egypt’s first objective now is to secure a binding agreement with Ethiopia for involvement in the operation and management of GERD. Secondly, Egypt will try to stop Ethiopia from building additional dams on Abay and its tributaries, including preventing their use for irrigation projects. Then Egypt will do everything to stop other riparian countries from carrying out similar projects on the Nile and its tributaries,” the scholar told The Reporter.

He believes the inauguration signals the beginning of a deeper diplomatic war than has been witnessed over the past 14 years.

The scholar observes there are gray areas in Ethiopia’s plans for the dam as well.

“For instance, Ethiopia never affirmed its position when it comes to utilizing Abay for agricultural irrigation projects,” he said, predicting that diverting water for irrigation would lead to direct confrontation between the two countries.

“Egypt also continues to demand a binding agreement to secure its water share. But Ethiopia never affirmed its own water share. How much would that be? Who has the power to decide the volume?” asked the scholar.

Another Ethiopian scholar who was part of the diplomatic team around GERD also believes that tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt will grow more intense.

“Ethiopia built the largest dam possible on Abay; GERD is the largest dam the river can sustain. Egypt tried everything to stop the construction of the dam. Once it is completed, Egypt’s intent is to be involved in the operation and administration of the dam,” he said, speaking anonymously.

The scholar notes that Cairo is desperate to secure a binding agreement that would guarantee water flow levels, even in the face of drought in Ethiopia.

“As long as these questions are there, Egypt’s pressure on Ethiopia will never stop,” said the scholar.

Like his colleague, this expert foresees that Cairo will turn its attention to three major objectives: getting involved in the dam’s operation, stopping additional developments along the river, and securing an agreement that would allow it maintain its “water share” during drought seasons.

Fekahmed Negash Nuru is a seasoned negotiator, strategist, and advocate for regional cooperation on GERD and transboundary water diplomacy. A renowned scholar, Fekahmed has been part of the negotiations surrounding GERD since the beginning.

“Egypt knew their baseless arguments could not bear results so in the end they resorted to different tactics,” said Fekahmed.

Among these tactics, according to the expert, included destabilizing Ethiopia by supporting armed factions within the country.

“They lied, they threatened. Their final option is damaging the dam. But they’ll never go this route,” said the expert.

One of the scholars who spoke to The Reporter cautions that, no matter the case, Ethiopia must prepare to respond to Egypt’s leverage amid fast-changing global geopolitics.

“Since Trump’s second term started, global politics has changed to transactional politics. This system is more advantageous for Egypt than for Ethiopia. Egypt has a lot of leverage to offer Trump. Ethiopia does not, so Ethiopia must not rest now,” said the scholar.

Fekahmed concurs.

“America could not be neutral in GERD’s case. In 1978, Anwar Sadat and the Israeli PM signed the Camp David agreement. Alongside those accords were a bunch of related agreements, including key bilateral deals: one between the US and Egypt, and another between the US and Israel,” he told The Reporter.

“‎Under the US-Egypt agreement, Washington committed to providing Egypt with 1.3 billion dollars’ worth of military aid annually. In return, Egypt accepted recognition of what it calls its ‘historic water share’ of the Nile. In effect, the agreement gave political acknowledgment to Egypt’s claim over the Nile. Since then, the US, as far as it can, has supported that position—not out of neutrality, but because of the binding commitments it undertook.”

Fekahmed observes that Trump and Egyptian President El-Sisi also have a good relationship.

“Trump called El-Sisi ‘my favorite dictator.’ Egypt provided money for Trump’s election campaign,” said the expert.

Yacob observes that Egypt’s attempts to involve the US, the World Bank, and the UN in what it has consistently attempted to frame as a regional and global security issue have failed.

“Egypt continued its arguments based on colonial era treaties. The negotiations froze, and have been stuck for the past several years. Egypt is still asking to be part of GERD’s operation and administration. They demanded this agreement from Ethiopia. Ethiopia refused,” said Yacob.

The expert argues Cairo’s desire to get involved in operation is related to its mission to stop any further development along Abay and its tributaries.

“Ethiopia’s next plan is building additional dams and projects. Such big dams are all ideal along the Abay River and its tributaries like Baro, Akobo and other rivers. Egypt wants to stop Ethiopia from building any additional dams. They believe securing an agreement will stop the construction of additional projects,” said Yacob.

The scholars urge that Ethiopia should work hard on mobilizing allies to counter Egypt’s next volley of pressure.

“Egypt counted on friendly countries to support its cause during the arguments at the UN Security Council. But many heavyweights sided with Ethiopia,” said Yacob. “The future remains tough for Ethiopia. A lot of issues will spiral. Ethiopia must leverage diplomacy to pull as many strings as it can. If Ethiopia can harness its potential, many other countries will benefit. So, the world should support Ethiopia instead of being an obstacle.”

Analysts posit that Ethiopia can muster this leverage by strengthening regional integration and deepening political and economic ties with riparian countries and neighboring nations. They see electricity exports from GERD as a good way to achieve this.

The experts say Ethiopia can also mobilize allies by playing its part in stabilizing the Horn’s rapidly changing and conflict-driven geopolitics.

“From central Africa to the Horn, and from the Red Sea to the Middle East, conflict and instability are surging alarmingly. Every state is descending to conflict. Ethiopia has no option but to outshine as the stabilizer. This way, Ethiopia can attain a significant position in the eyes of the international community and the UN, which will be helpful to counter Egypt’s influences. But if Ethiopia itself continues grappling with domestic conflicts and tensions with neighboring countries, that would be fertile ground for Egypt’s next offensive,” said one diplomat.

Many see GERD as a symbol of national unity with the potential to end the ongoing domestic conflicts. Many also argue the dam has more national consensus than initiatives like the National Dialogue and Transitional Justice.

“GERD is inside the heart of each and every Ethiopian citizen. The dam unified Ethiopians from every walk of life. There were many initiatives aimed at bringing all Ethiopians to unified national consensus. However, GERD unified Ethiopians better than any initiative. No ethnic or linguistic differences have deterred that consensus. No Ethiopian was against the dam,” said Aregawi.

However, that approach left the economy with ballooning debt, skyrocketing inflation rates, and massive foreign exchange shortages.

‎These distortions then seemingly led policymakers to turn to the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) framework in a bid to bridge the country’s infrastructure needs and the recurring financing gaps.

‎After the political upheaval of 2018, the government introduced Proclamation No. 1076/2018 as a means of achieving its ambitious vision for development.

The Ministry of Finance, which introduced the legislation, explained its intent as a legal framework “to facilitate PPP, recognizing that the private sector is essential to support the country’s economic growth and improve the quality of public services, particularly in infrastructure.”

‎A PPP Board chaired by the Minister of Finance and a PPP Directorate-General were established to guide the new model. Projects ranging from solar farms to expressways were earmarked for tendering under the structures.

‎Seven years on, however, the record is thin and critics say the grand PPP agenda remains unable to take off. Analysts and economists contend the model is stumbling owing to institutional and capacity gaps, and an inability to incorporate the domestic private sector.

Crafting PPP deals requires financial modelling, risk allocation, and long-term projections on inflation, exchange rates, and consumer demand. Ethiopia’s PPP unit is still learning the craft, and private investors often walk away unconvinced.

‎Economists have long argued the model was imported too quickly and that the government has used the scheme to usher in foreign investment, pushing out the domestic private sector. Some critics argue the scheme is better described as ‘public-foreign-private-partnership’ rather than genuine PPP.

‎”PPP, as we call it, is a very complex transaction. It is regulated by law. It is only within that legal framework that such projects can be carried out,” said Mehrteab Leul, an experienced corporate lawyer. “Sometimes, however, outside of those legal frameworks, you hear ministries or offices referring to ‘PPP.’ That is not in line with the law. There is a legal framework, and it is within that legal framework that it must be done”.

The PPP Proclamation lists which government entities in Ethiopia are authorized to implement PPPs under their mandate. Mehrteab observes the law gives priority to how value for money is guaranteed.

‎”When one birr of government money is spent, what value does it bring? That is why the private sector and government are supposed to work together, isn’t it? ‎So, if one Birr of public money is spent, the private partner must bring in something equivalent and worthwhile,” he said.

The attorney notes that the question then becomes: how can this be verified?

The law introduces a number of safeguards; including requirements for public tendering.

Mehrteab uses a hypothetical power plant project as an example.

“If a PPP project is for building a power plant, there are usually many parties involved. But the main one is the private party. The private party forms a project company, preparing to develop the power plant. Then there is what is called the off-taker, the one who purchases the power that is generated,” he said.

‎In the Ethiopian context, electricity is the only form of power that can be purchased, and by law, it can only be bought by a single entity: Ethiopian Electric Power (EEP). The state-owned enterprise has exclusive legal authority over electricity purchases, making it the off-taker in this scenario.

The critical question, according to Mehrteab, then becomes: at what tariff—at what price per kilowatt-hour—will EEP buy the electricity?

‎”That is public money being spent, because EEP is paying out of public funds. To ensure the price is fair and correct, a competitive tender must be conducted. ‎Under the revised proclamation, direct procurement of PPP projects is also allowed. Beyond that, the law spells out, in detail, the specific procedures that must be followed,” he said.

Others highlight that Ethiopia’s domestic private sector lacks the scale to invest billions in power plants or toll roads, often pushing the emergence of such partnerships to be concluded between the government and foreign companies.

‎On the other hand, even the definition of PPP in Ethiopia remains contested.

‎Getahun Moges, an energy sector expert and retired regulator, was cited in a UNECA 2023 paper as saying that, in Ethiopia’s case, the pace of development and engaging the private sector has been slow and sometimes results in unnecessary delays.

“Also, there is a big challenge of understanding the regulatory frameworks for PPPs, feasibility, and procurement regimes in the country,” reads the paper.

‎Some analysts argue that projects like the Addis-Adama Expressway, built by China Communications Construction Company, Ltd. with financing from China’s Exim Bank fall under the umbrella of PPP.

Researchers hail it as “Ethiopia’s first accomplishment in road projects via PPP arrangements,” albeit one that pre-dated the 2018 proclamation. ‎Others insist that no “proper” PPP project has yet been executed under the legal framework, arguing that projects such as the expressway were not officially designated as PPP projects.

‎The same ambiguity surrounds the Hidasie Telecom distribution project, often cited as a PPP in structure, though never formally labeled as such.

A pipeline document published by the Finance Ministry’s PPP Directorate-General indicated that by March 2021, the PPP board had approved a total of 23 projects across the energy, transport, housing, and petroleum infrastructure sectors.

Energy dominated the portfolio, with eight solar projects, six hydropower schemes, and five wind farms on the books, according to the document.

Beyond power, the pipeline also features three expressway projects, a single large-scale affordable housing development in Addis Ababa, and a petroleum storage depot in Dukem, 40 kilometers southeast of Addis Ababa.

‎The most advanced projects are in solar power, the document indicates. Two projects—Gad and Dicheto, each with a planned 125 MW capacity—have already been awarded to ACWA Power, with power purchase and implementation agreements signed.

‎The remaining six solar ventures, located in the Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, Afar, and Somali regions, are moving through the request for proposal (RFP) and bidding stages, with alternative sites and environmental studies still under review in some cases.

‎On the other hand, some other sectors still remain largely at the feasibility stage. All six hydropower projects, including the Genale Dawa-5 and -6 plants, Chemoga Yeda I and II, Dabus, and Halele Werabersa I and II, are still in the process of consultant recruitment and study preparation.

‎The three road projects—Adama–Awash, Awash–Mieso, and Mieso–Dire Dawa expressways—are also under feasibility assessment, with private participation anticipated in the later construction phase.

‎Similarly, all five wind power projects, from Aysha III in Somali to Debre Berhan in Amhara, remain at the study or pre-tender stage.

‎Beyond green energy and roads, Ethiopia’s PPP pipeline includes a USD 2.4 billion affordable housing scheme in the capital, expected to benefit nearly 80,000 households, and a petroleum storage depot designed to reduce the country’s vulnerability to supply disruptions. Both are still in the feasibility study stage.

‎This staging reflects a pattern across the PPP pipeline: while two solar plants have reached contractual closure, the vast majority of projects remain in preparatory phases, pending studies and tendering before construction and operation can commence.

A recent Ministry performance report document obtained by The Reporter indicated that PPP agreements that cover the construction of 4,175 housing units, 48 shops, and two market centers at an overall cost of 50.1 billion Birr were signed on July 3, 2025.

‎“PPP projects are essentially financed by the private sector,” Mehrtetab told The Reporter. “The private sector builds the project and then delivers it either to the government entity or directly to the public.”

‎He pointed to earlier experiences with toll roads.

“If another toll road such as Addis Ababa-Adama were built under PPP, the government would not pay the private sector directly. Instead, vehicles using the road would cover the cost over time,” explained the attorney.

‎Mehrteab stressed that the rationale behind PPPs is to address gaps the state cannot fill on its own.

“It is the government’s responsibility to provide services like electricity generation and distribution, but there is an infrastructure gap,” he explained. “Since the government cannot build infrastructure at the scale required, the private sector steps in to fill that gap.”

‎Still, he admitted Ethiopia lacks a proven track record in the area.

“So far, we do not have a robust record of successful PPP implementation. Apart from a few projects in the pipeline, we cannot say PPP has succeeded at a large scale.”

Part of the complexity, he added, lies in how risks are shared.

“A risk matrix must be prepared when designing the project. The principle is that risks should be allocated to the party best able to manage them,” said Mehrteab.

According to the expert, one of the biggest setbacks for PPPs in Ethiopia has for long been the issue of foreign exchange.

‎“In the past, PPPs were frustrated mainly by convertibility guarantee problems,” he said. “If a foreign company invested in a power plant, it would be paid in Birr, but it wanted dollar revenue. Ensuring that its Birr revenues could be converted and repatriated was a huge issue.”

The government, he noted, had been unwilling to shoulder that risk and as a result, many projects stalled.

However, Mehrteab observes that new directives from the central bank could signal a big change.

“Now, for PPPs and other strategically important projects, the government is offering convertibility guarantees,” he said. “This has reassured companies that their funds can be converted, which is a positive development.”

‎He added that the regulatory stance on offshore accounts had also shifted.

“PPPs are usually highly leveraged and mostly financed through loans. Lenders want absolute certainty that repayments will be made on the exact date. To ensure this, a cascade of offshore accounts must be opened,” he explained. “In the past, offshore accounts were seen negatively, as if they were a way of siphoning money out.”

The central bank recently permitted the use of offshore accounts for PPPs and strategic sectors.

‎With these policy shifts, Meheretab sees cautious optimism.

“Going forward, these reforms are expected to create the conditions for Ethiopia to finally build a successful track record in PPPs,” said the attorney.

Forex shortages and repatriation guarantees aside, PPPs remain fraught with risks emanating from low tariffs, capacity constraints, and political and domestic hurdles that often discourage both domestic and foreign investors.

Experts who spoke to The Reporter highlighted low government-set electricity tariffs as an example.

“Many potential private partners refrained from participating in the power sector PPP, stating the power tariff is low,” said one analyst.

‎Even insiders at the Ministry acknowledge that drafting PPP contracts requires skills in economic forecasting and inflation modelling—capacity Ethiopia is still building.

‎One of the starkest examples of Ethiopia’s PPP struggles comes from its solar program.

The Gad (125 MW) and Dicheto (125 MW) solar projects were among the first PPP power plants put on paper. But the foreign partner withdrew from the project before financial close, reportedly over FX and tariff concerns.

‎Both projects remain stuck in Ethiopia’s official “pipeline,” years after being announced. No new tariff arrangements have been made public, though industry observers say the government is currently making positive moves towards improving power purchase agreements it hopes will attract private capital.

‎Meanwhile, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has urged the government to deepen PPP reforms.

“It is key to strengthen PPP efforts to support the renewables sector and raise capital for investment,” noted a 2025 policy paper.

‎On paper, PPPs remain one of Ethiopia’s most promising solutions to the financing gap in infrastructure. The country’s legal framework exists, institutions are in place, and projects are in the pipeline.

‎But capacity, credibility, and confidence remain missing ingredients. Until investors are assured of repatriation guarantees, bankable tariffs, and technically robust contracts, progress will remain slow, analysts caution.

“PPP is still a work in progress for Ethiopia. We know the challenges. But we also know the alternative—more public borrowing—is no longer sustainable,” said an investment expert speaking with The Reporter anonymously.